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TRIBAL TOOLS & LEGAL LEVERS
FOR HALTING FOSSIL FUEL TRANSPORT &
EXPORTS THROUGH THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
Mary Christina Wood, Anna Elza Brady, & Brendan
Keenan Jr. 1
I.  

INTRODUCTION

Every day in the Pacific Northwest, untold volumes of fossil
fuels pass through tribal geographies en route to foreign and
domestic markets. Coal and oil trains rumble across Indian
reservations and through ceded territories. Pipelines pump oil and
natural gas over ancestral homelands to export terminals in treaty
fishing waters. Trucks roll down highways carrying volatile
materials or heavy equipment used for drilling, sometimes travelling
on narrow roads perilously close to salmon streams that Native
people have stewarded for millennia.
The transport of toxic fossil fuels through traditional tribal
territories poses numerous threats to Native communities as well as
their non-Native neighbors. Oil spills, explosions, water
contamination, and particulate drift are among the most obvious and
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immediate burdens of risk.2 Transport of fossil fuels for ultimate
combustion as sources of energy also exacerbates the long-range
hazards of climate change. Inundation of coastal Native villages3
and changing harvest cycles of First Foods4 are two of the many
forms of damage that tribes already experience on the frontlines of
the global climate crisis. As sea level continues to rise, extinction
rates accelerate, and climate systems grow increasingly erratic,
halting fossil fuel transport becomes ever more crucial to the longterm viability of life on Earth.
Tribes are responding with remarkable leadership in the face
of climate change and the daily direct risks posed by such fossil fuel
transport and export. As the original sovereigns of this continent,
tribes possess an array of distinct legal tools, which they are
successfully deploying to halt fossil fuel infrastructure in its tracks.
Innovating sophisticated legal strategies, tribes are filling a vacuum
left by the failure of mainstream political leaders to meaningfully
address climate change. Through both cultural practices and
political diplomacy, native nations and grassroots indigenous
communities now lead the resistance to fossil fuels and the shift to
carbon-neutral economies.
Pacific Northwest tribes play a particularly important role in
such a shift because of the region’s position as the portal—or
barricade—in the fossil fuel supply chain. The Pacific Northwest is
renowned for its lush temperate forests, pristine waterways, and
vibrant fisheries, all of which have sustained indigenous human
communities for thousands of years. But more recently, the region’s
geographic location has become a prominent draw in a global
market distribution scheme for fossil fuels. The Pacific Northwest
lies poised between major fossil fuel deposits to the east in interior
North America, and voracious Asian energy markets west across the
Pacific Ocean.5 In order for natural gas from the Uintah Basin or oil
from North Dakota to reach power plants in Beijing or drivers in
Taipei through the most direct route, those fossil fuels must pass
2

See infra Section II.
Ashley Ahearn, “Washington Tribe Confronts Climate Change, Sea Level
Rise,” KUOW, Dec. 2, 2015: http://kuow.org/post/washington-tribe-confrontsclimate-change-sea-level-rise
4
See “Climate Change,” Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission website:
http://www.critfc.org/fish-and-watersheds/climate/.
5
Sightline Institute, “The Thin Green Line”:
http://www.sightline.org/research/thin-green-line/.
3
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through Oregon, Washington, or British Columbia and then across
the Pacific Ocean. The two leading countries caught in this panPacific fossil fuel web also happen to be the world’s top emitters of
carbon dioxide: together the U.S. and China were responsible for
spewing 44% of total global emissions in 2014.6 Positioned as an
economic valve between these two single greatest contributors to the
global climate crisis, giving this damp and sparsely populated region
known as the Pacific Northwest holds substantial leverage over the
world’s total amount of carbon emissions.7 Tribal sovereigns of the
Pacific Northwest are now using this leverage to block the disastrous
flow of fossil fuels.
Fossil fuel transport and export schemes rely on a panoply
of permits, and denial of just one layer of authorization can halt a
project. Due to the variety of jurisdictions through which transport
projects must pass, permitting processes often involve a matrix of
regulations. Between federal, state, and local jurisdictions, a dozen
or more permits are often necessary in order to ship fuels
domestically and export them overseas. A single denial at any level
can prevent a fossil fuel transport or export project from proceeding.
Permitting authorities exercise discretion at every turn.
As sovereign nations, tribes wield potent legal prerogatives
that can directly affect these proposed fossil fuel infrastructure
projects. This Article examines and catalogs the array of legal levers
available to tribes to halt fossil fuel infrastructure and assert
authority as co-trustees of essential natural resources. Section II of
this Article surveys the context of urgency that motivates tribes to
act. It discusses both the long-range and immediate threats of fossil
fuel infrastructure to tribal communities and describes the rising
movement of indigenous environmental leadership regionally and
nationally. It then sets forth the legal posture of proposed projects in
the Northwest. Because the legal tools available to tribes differ on
and off reservation, the array and efficacy of legal levers will vary
according to the physical geography and political boundaries
through which a given transport project proposes to pass. Section III
6

International Energy Agency, “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion
Highlights,” Dec. 2016:
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CO2Emissionsfro
mFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf.
7
See Eric de Place, “Northwest Fossil Fuel Exports,” SIGHTLINE INSTITUTE,
Sept. 2014: http://www.sightline.org/research_item/northwest-fossil-fuelexports-2/.
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delves into on-reservation regulatory and property law mechanisms
with a specific look at the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ recently revised
right-of-way easement regulations. Section IV explores potent
Indian law doctrines that extend off the reservations: the federal
Indian trust responsibility and tribal treaty rights.8 Significantly, the
trust responsibility functions as both the federal government’s duty
of trusteeship over tribal property as well as its duty of care and
protection towards tribes when federal actions taken off the
reservations affect tribal interests. Throughout, this Article presents
case studies of tribes successfully asserting sovereign legal
prerogatives to stop fossil fuel transport and export at all
jurisdictional levels—federal, state, and local.
Through their pursuit of legal remedies to protect their
people and resources against transport and export proposals, and by
issuing multiple clear resolutions opposing fossil fuel infrastructure
projects as a whole throughout the region, tribes are leading a
necessary shift toward decarbonizing the global economy—a
measure deemed essential by leading scientists to prevent
unmitigated climate disaster and runaway heating.9 Their assertion
of climate leadership at this crucial hour announces the position of
Native Nations as rightful sovereign co-trustees of planet Earth. This
Article aims to support tribes in this ground-up effort—an effort
which, in its broadest sense, endeavors to replace fossil-fueled
8

For a general discussion of treaty language in the context of climate change,
see Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Everything Old is New Again: Enforcing
Tribal Treaty Provisions to Protect Climate Change Threatened Resources,
(Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished working paper):
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652954. By contrast, this
article focuses on tribal efforts to use treaty language to stop specific fossil fuel
projects.
9
See James Hansen, et al., “Assessing ‘Dangerous Climate Change’: Required
Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People, Future Generations
and Nature,” 8 PLOS One 1, Dec. 3, 2013 [hereinafter “Climate Prescription”]:
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0081648. The goal of decarbonization
involves economic and feasibility analysis well outside the scope and purpose of
this article. For an in-depth analysis, see Deep Decarbonization Pathways
Project: http://deepdecarbonization.org. It should also be noted that
decarbonization (arriving at zero emissions by 2050) is not even alone sufficient
at this point to prevent global climate catastrophe. Scientists emphasize the
need for “negative emissions,” i.e. drawing down the excess carbon dioxide
from the atmosphere currently heating the planet (and causing present calamities
such as superstorms, massive floods, droughts, fires, and heat waves). In other
words, there must be a cleanup of excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.
See Hansen et al, id. For natural methods to draw down carbon using soil
sequestration techniques, see Bronson W. Griscom, et al., Natural Climate
Solutions, PNAS (2017): http://www.pnas.org/content/114/44/11645.
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colonialism with a future that is just, healthful, and sustainable for
all people and all beings.
II.  

CULTURES AND CLIMATE: CONTEXTUALIZING THE CRISIS

Virtually every square mile of the Pacific Northwest is the
aboriginal territory of numerous Native tribes who have inhabited
these lands since time immemorial. Original tribal rights overlay and
extend across the entire region. Recognized in exchange for cession
of vast aboriginal tribal territories, these enduring rights remain
memorialized in solemn treaty promises and other legal agreements.
They affirmatively obligate federal and state co-sovereigns to
uphold tribal interests in ancestral lands and resources. Fossil fuel
transport and export infrastructure pose grave threats to these
longstanding rights.
Such projects include all forms of infrastructure used to
move hydrocarbon-rich materials across distances—including oil
and natural gas pipelines, coal and oil trains, and export terminals
that process and load these fuels (as well as their refined derivatives
such as xylene). Transportation of such hazardous substances poses
both imminent and long-range dangers. Climate disruption presents
an existential threat to Humanity as a whole, but tribes feel
immediate and worsening impacts within their traditional territories.
This Section beings with an overview of both the climate
threats and the localized, acute, and immediate dangers posed by
fossil fuel projects. It concludes with a brief survey of the legal and
administrative hurdles that proposed fossil fuel projects must clear
in order to operate. As the discussion shows, there are many entry
points for tribes to assert their sovereign prerogatives to arrest the
flow of fossil fuels across tribal geographies—both reservations and
ceded lands subject to reserved rights.
A.   The Climate Emergency
In September, 2018, the Secretary General of the United
Nations issued a warning that the world must begin rapid, deep
emissions cuts by 2020 to avert runaway climate change.10 A year
10

World Must Act By 2020 to Avoid Runaway Climate Change: UN Chief,
PHYS.ORG, Sep. 11, 2018: https://phys.org/news/2018-09-world-runawayclimate-chief.html#jCp.
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earlier, in 2017, the former United Nations climate chief, Christiana
Figueres, joined sixty scientists, policy leaders, and economists to
author a comment in the scientific journal Nature calling for deep
decarbonization and aggressive reduction of fossil fuel usage,
warning, “If we delay, the conditions for human prosperity will be
severely curtailed.”11 Yet U.S. President Donald Trump has stated
his intention to develop $50 trillion worth of domestic fossil fuels,
including shale, oil, coal, and natural gas.12
The law has never encountered a threat as pervasive, grave,
and urgent as the present climate crisis. Scientists warn that carbon
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions place Earth in
“imminent peril”—on the verge of an irreversible tipping point that
would impose catastrophic conditions on generations of humanity
to come.13 As described by Dr. James Hansen, formerly the chief
climate scientist of the United States at NASA’s Goddard Institute
of Space Studies, continued carbon pollution will “transform the
planet.”14 Experts predict that floods, hurricanes, killer heat waves,
fires, disease, crop losses, food shortages, and droughts will arrive
with far greater magnitude and regularity.15 Rising sea levels would
inundate coastal areas worldwide and trigger desperate mass human
migrations.16 In May 2010, two separate groups of scientists
published papers warning that the melting of the Western Antarctic
ice sheet is now unstoppable, set to cause an inevitable sea level rise
11

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Turning the Climate Tide by
2020, SCIENCE DAILY, June 28, 2017:
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2017/06/170628144848.htm; Christiana
Figueres, Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Gail Whiteman, et al., Three Years to
Safeguard Our Climate, NATURE, June 28, 2017:
https://www.nature.com/news/three-years-to-safeguard-our-climate-1.22201.
12
Michael Bastach, ‘Untapped Energy’: Trump Promises a $50 Trillion
Economic Stimulus, THE DAILY CALLER, Sept. 23, 2016:
http://dailycaller.com/2016/09/23/untapped-energy-trump-promises-a-50trillion-economic-stimulus/.
13
See generally FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY SCIENTISTS
FEAR TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE xxiv-xxvi (2007) (describing
“unstoppable planetary forces” and the end of climatic stability).
14
Jim Hansen, The Threat to the Planet, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 13, 2006:
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/jul/13/the-threat-to-the-planet/.
15
See generally “Climate Change Impacts In the United States, U.S. National
Climate Assessment 4” (2014) [hereinafter “Climate Change Impacts Report”]:
http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/overview/overview.
16
Koko Warner, et al., “In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate
Change on Human Migration and Displacement” iv, 2 (2009):
http://ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_media.pdf.
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of at least ten feet in coming centuries.17 They warn that most of the
world’s coastal cities will have to be abandoned—and Louisiana’s
state government is already crafting a plan to do just that,
depopulating its coastal zone.18
While some climate dynamics will unfold over longer time
spans, it is no longer possible to assume that severe threats are
postponed for future generations. Earth has already warmed about
0.8° Celsius over the past century.21 A report of the U.S. Global
Climate Change Research Program states unequivocally: “Climate
change, once considered an issue for a distant future, has moved
firmly into the present . . . . Precipitation patterns are changing, sea
level is rising, the oceans are becoming more acidic, and the
frequency and intensity of some extreme weather events are
increasing.”22 Though climate disruption affects different parts of
Earth in different ways—from droughts to floods to superstorms—
no part of Earth is safe from global heating.23 Climate crisis presents
a clear and present danger, threatening the basic habitability of the
planet for humans and other species.24 As Dr. Hansen and other
scientists stated in an amicus brief supporting youth plaintiffs in a
case challenging government’s fossil fuel policy, “[F]ailure to act
with all deliberate speed in the face of the clear scientific evidence
of the danger functionally becomes a decision to eliminate the
option of preserving a habitable climate system.”25
As elaborated below, the combustion of fossil fuels largely
17

Justin Gillis & Kenneth Chang, “Scientists Warn of Rising Oceans from Polar
Melt, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2014:
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/science/earth/collapse-of-parts-of-westantarctica-ice-sheet-has-begun-scientists-say.html.
18
Id. For the Louisiana plan, see Christopher Flavelle, Louisiana, Sinking Fast,
Prepares to Empty Out Its Coastal Plain, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 22, 2017:
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/louisiana-sinking-fastprepares-to-empty-out-its-coastal-plain.
21
“Climate Prescription,” supra note 9, at 4. To provide context, the Earth has
not been this warm in over 125,000 years. See Doyle Rice, “The Last Time the
Earth Was This Warm Was 125,000 Years Ago,” U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 18, 2017:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2017/01/18/hottest-year-onrecord/96713338/.
22
“Climate Change Impacts Report,” supra note 15, at 1.
23
See id. at 7-10.
24
Brief for Dr. James Hansen as Amicus Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellants at 7-8, Alec L. v. Jackson, No. 4:11-cv-02203-EMC, 2011 WL
8583134 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011):
http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/Hansen%20Amicus%20.pdf.
25
Id. at 7 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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drives the global climate crisis.26 “Fossil fuel” is an umbrella term
used to describe a variety of hydrocarbon-rich geologic deposits
derived from decayed organic materials such as ancient plants and
animals, which were buried underground and transformed over eons
into highly combustible sources of energy. 27 Common fossil fuels
include coal, natural gas, and petroleum, which takes the form of oil,
or can be refined into derivatives such as gasoline and diesel fuels.
Fossil fuels power much of the world’s transportation and electrical
grids. These valuable, common—yet dangerous—substances are
extracted from the Earth’s crust through an array of mining methods
including pumping, strip and pit mining, and hydraulic fracturing,
also known as “fracking.” New technologies have enabled the
extraction of fossil fuels from dispersed geologic formations such as
oil shale and tar sands, the development of which was economically
prohibitive, until recently. Major North American fossil fuel
deposits transported and exported through the Pacific Northwest
include: oil from the Bakken formation in western North Dakota;
coal and coalbed methane from the Powder River Basin of Montana
and Wyoming; natural gas from eastern Utah and western Colorado;
and tar sands from Alberta, Canada.
The causal relationship between the combustion of fossil
fuels and climate change has been exhaustively documented and
empirically proven.28 Burning of fossil fuels accounted for 93.7% of
all CO2 emitted within the United States in 2014, with CO2
accounting for 80.9% of total domestic greenhouse gas emissions.29
The International Energy Agency reports that, in 2015, the United
States was responsible for 16% of total global CO2 emissions,
second only to China, which is itself a target market for American

26

See “Climate Change,” UNITED NATIONS:
http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/. There are other
significant factors as well, such as methane from concentrated animal
operations, but these causes are beyond the scope of this article.
27
“Fossil Fuel,” SCIENCE DAILY:
https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/fossil_fuel.htm.
28
See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse
Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2014,” Executive Summary, Apr. 2016:
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201604/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2016-chapter-executive-summary.pdf.
29
Id. at ES-8-9. According to the EPA, fossil fuel combustion has generated
76% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions since 1990. Id. at ES-9.
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fossil fuel exports.30 In 2007 the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
noted, “[t]he EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal
connection between manmade greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming.”31 The Court further found, “The harms associated with
climate change are serious and well-recognized.”32 While other
sources of GHG pollution (such as methane from landfills and
concentrated feed lots and emissions from deforestation) must also
be addressed, preventing or minimizing fossil fuel extraction and
combustion remains an urgent step humans must take to address
global climate change.33
As the original sovereigns of this continent, tribes are both
uniquely impacted by, and uniquely positioned to address, global
climate change.34 Tribal sovereignty and indigenous cultures are
fundamentally tied to ancestral homelands and natural resources
endemic to traditional territories.35 Tribal wellbeing remains in
many ways contingent on the health of biological communities,
which sustain traditional subsistence gathering and Native spiritual
practices, as well as modern economic livelihoods. Courts have
recognized, for example, that salmon—threatened by climate
change- provide a key component of Pacific Northwest tribal diets,
cultural identity, and economic livelihoods.36 By upsetting natural
balances and triggering unforeseeable cascading effects, climate
change unravels the biological systems upon which tribes rely. In
30

International Energy Agency, “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion
Highlights,” at 12, Dec. 2016:
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CO2Emissionsfro
mFuelCombustion_Highlights_2016.pdf.
31
Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007).
32
Id. at 521.
33
See Climate Prescription, supra note 9, at 9-12. Scientists also emphasize that
decarbonization (reducing CO2 emissions to zero by 2015) is not alone enough
to stave off climate catastrophe because the atmosphere has excess carbon
already driving the current climate disasters. Drawing carbon out of the
atmosphere through natural climate solutions will also be necessary, as a
cleanup of the atmosphere. Id.
34
See Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The
Impact of Climate Change,” 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007); Randall S. Abate
& Elizabeth Ann Kronk, “Commonality Among Unique Indigenous
Communities: An Introduction to Climate Change and Its Impacts on Indigenous
Peoples,” 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 179 (2013).
35
Mary Christina Wood & Zach Welcker, “Tribes as Trustees Again (Part 1):
The Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement,” 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 375 (2008).
36
U.S. v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 845 (9th Cir. 2016).
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the Pacific Northwest, many tribal communities and reservations are
located in low-lying areas adjacent to the sea and are suffering
impacts of sea level rise.37 The region is also already reeling from
climate impacts such as extreme wildfires, flooding, loss of
snowpack, and ocean acidification. 38
Under the public trust doctrine, first articulated in Roman
law and long recognized by the United States Supreme Court,39 the
states and federal government have a firm fiduciary responsibility to
steward natural assets in trust for present and future generations as
beneficiaries.40 Tribes have an important role to play in this trust
framework as well.41 As the first sovereigns of this continent, tribes
remain the original trustees of the entire natural res (trust
endowment) now imperiled by escalating climate chaos. Landmark
treaty fishing rights decisions rendered by Judges Boldt and Belloni
more than four decades ago recognized Pacific Northwest tribes as
co-tenants of shared fisheries.42 Native nations are uniquely wellsituated to assert standing as co-tenants and co-trustees of the shared
atmosphere as well, to prevent further climate violence to their
peoples and, indeed, all people.43
B.   Direct Threats of Fossil Fuel Transport on Tribes
Beyond systemic damage and threatened societal collapse
from climate change, fossil fuel infrastructure carries enormous
37

See Jessica A. Knoblauch, Climate Change Forces Quinault Tribe to Seek
Higher Ground, EARTHJUSTICE, Mar. 12, 2018:
https://earthjustice.org/blog/2018-march/climate-change-forces-the-quinaulttribe-to-seek-higher-ground.
38
Union of Concerned Scientists, Confronting Climate Change in Oregon
(2015): https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/regional-information/californiaand-western-states/confronting-climate-change-in-oregon#.W7lHpVJRf-Y
39
See J. INST., 2.1.1 (T Sandars trans. 4th ed. 1867) (“By the law of nature these
things are common to mankind-the air, running water, the sea, and consequently
the shores of the sea.”); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453
(1892) (“The state can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them . . . than
it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the
preservation of the peace.”).
40
See MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A
NEW ECOLOGICAL AGE, Cambridge U. Press: New York (2013).
41
Mary Christina Wood, “Tribal Trustees in Climate Crisis,” 2 AM. IND. L. J. 2
518 (2014).
42
Id. at 543.
43
Id. at 545.
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harm to nearby tribal communities—through toxic effluent releases,
damaged air quality, desecration of cultural and spiritual sites, and
interference with treaty fishing rights.44 These climate harms
perpetuate the profound assaults of industrial incursion that have
persisted since first contact.45
Oil spills are among the most serious and common acute
dangers of fossil fuel transport. According to the Pipeline and
Hazardous Material Safety Administration, 633 pipeline leaks and
explosions occurred in the United States in 2016, averaging 1.7
pipeline incidents per day.46 These incidents caused 16 deaths, 87
injuries, and more than $321 million in clean-up costs.47 Pipeline
ruptures are considered inevitable over time and can present serious
catastrophes.48
Shipping oil by train poses hazards as well. The 2016
derailment and oil spill at Mosier, Oregon presented a vivid and
sobering example of dangerous “bomb trains.” On June 3, 2016,
sixteen cars in a 96-car train carrying crude oil derailed beside the
Columbia River.49 Several train cars ruptured and exploded,
releasing 47,000 gallons of oil into the air, soil, and nearby

44

See “Environmental Effects Of Oil Spill,” ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
CENTERS: https://www.environmentalpollutioncenters.org/oil-spill/effects/oil;
Zak Cheney Rice, An Oil Spill Is Threatening Native American Lands-And No
One Is Paying Attention, BUSINESS INSIDER, Jun. 8, 2016:
https://www.businessinsider.com/an-oil-spill-is-threatening-native-americanlands-in-oregon-2016-6; Maki Somosot, Indian Tribe Suing Companies For Oil
Spill Damages, HOUMATODAY.COM, Oct. 10, 2015:
http://www.houmatoday.com/news/20151010/indian-tribe-suing-companies-foroil-spill-damages.
45
See Dobson, Darren, “Manifest Destiny and the Environmental Impacts of
Westward Expansion,” Flinders Journal of History and Politics, Vol. 29 2013:
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/81291419.pdf.
46
“Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trends,” Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety
Administration: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/datastats/pipelineincidenttrends.
47
Id.
48
See James Conca, Pick Your Poison For Crude—Pipeline, Rail, Truck or
Boat, FORBES, Apr. 26, 2014:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/04/26/pick-your-poison-forcrude-pipeline-rail-truck-or-boat/#789368fb17ac..
49
“Mosier UPRR Derailment,” Oregon Department of Environmental Quality,
updated Jan. 26, 2017:
http://www.deq.state.or.us/Webdocs/Forms/Output/FPController.ashx?SourceId
Type=11&SourceId=6115.

259

wastewater system.50 Nearly 3,000 tons of contaminated soil have
since been removed from the spill site.51 Upon investigation, the
Federal Railroad Administration made a preliminary finding that
“Union Pacific’s failure to maintain its track and track equipment
resulted in the derailment.”52 Six months after the spill, the cost of
cleanup at the Mosier site had reached nearly $9 million.53 The
Umatilla, Yakama, Warm Springs, and Nez Perce Tribes all retain
and exercise treaty fishing rights within the portion of the Columbia
where the Union Pacific spill occurred. Images of burning train cars
sending a plume of black smoke skyward confirmed tribes’ concerns
about transporting fossil fuels through the Columbia River Gorge.54
As JoDe Goudy, Chairman of the Yakama National Tribal Council,
remarked, “The oil train derailment threatens our very way of life.
The oil seeping into the Columbia is a reminder that these accidents
will happen . . . .”55
Water contamination from oil spills or other fossil fuel leaks
can harm the health of tribal members where domestic water
supplies have become contaminated. Studies show that exposure to
oil through contamination causes problems in human reproductive
health, and the chemicals used in oil cleanup operations are linked
to certain kinds of cancer.56 Destruction of local cultural resources
due to oil contamination measurably intensifies rates of depression
and other mental and emotional health conditions in affected

50

Lauren Dake, “Mosier’s Derailment Costs Adding Up,” THE COLUMBIAN,
Dec. 1, 2016: http://www.columbian.com/news/2016/dec/01/mosierderailments-costs-near-9-million/.
51
“Mosier Oil Train Derailment,” EPA:
https://response.epa.gov/site/site_profile.aspx?site_id=11637.
52
“Preliminary Factual Findings Report,” Federal Railroad Administration, 2-4,
June 23, 2016: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2895018-2016-0603-Preliminary-Factual-Findings-Report.html#document/p1.
53
See Dake, supra note 48.
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Id.
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“Mosier Train Derailment and Oil Spill,” Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission (CRITFC) newsletter, July 2016: http://www.critfc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/2016_07_dipnetter.pdf?x78172.
56
See Jon Gay, “The Health Effects of Oil Contamination: A Compilation of
Research,” Worchester Polytechnic Institute, 66-70, Dec. 15, 2010:
https://web.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-121510203112/unrestricted/Health_Effects_of_Oil_Contamination_-_Final_Report.pdf;
Annie-Rose Strasser, BP Oil Spill Cleanup Workers Are at a Higher Risk Of
Sickness, Cancer, THINKPROGRESS, Sept. 17, 2013: https://thinkprogress.org/bpoil-spill-cleanup-workers-are-at-higher-risk-of-sickness-cancer-aed007083c89/.
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communities.57 Fish also suffer from oil contamination, leading to
“reduced growth, enlarged livers, changes in heart and respiration
rates, fin erosion, and reproduction impairment.”58 This directly
implicates tribal treaty fishing rights and the commensurate habitat
protection duties affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, discussed below.59
Other aquatic life, such as shellfish and plants, suffer harm as well
from fossil fuel contamination.60
Interference with tribal fishing due to marine vessel traffic
forms another class of effects from fossil fuel transport. These
export schemes necessarily involve large industrial tanker ships that
transport coal, oil, natural gas, and other petroleum derivatives
across the Pacific Ocean. Each ship must pass through tribal treaty
fishing waters at least twice, both inbound and outbound, navigating
tidal marine lanes that are complex, narrow, and often busy. Every
tanker ship poses risks of spills, leaks, and explosions, as well as
incidences of damaged and destroyed tribal fishing gear.61 In 2003,
a barge spilled approximately 5,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil into
the Puget Sound near the Suquamish Tribe’s Port Madison
Reservation.62 The spill damaged an estuary, nearshore habitat, and
shellfish beds, and an important cultural and spiritual site within the
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Id.
“How Does Oil Impact Marine Life?,” NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, March 21, 2014:
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/oilimpacts.html.
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See supra Section IV.B for further discussion of the scope of treatyguaranteed tribal fishing rights.
60
“How Oil Harms Animals and Plants in Marine Environments,” NATIONAL
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, Sept. 21, 2018:
https://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/oil-spills/how-oilharms-animals-and-plants-marine-environments.html.
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See “Weigh Anchor: What Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain Pipeline Will
Mean for B.C.’s Coast,” THE GLOBE AND MAIL:
https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/kinder-morgan-transmountain-pipeline-bccoast/article35043172/?ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&; see also
Memorandum for Record from Michelle Walker, Chief, Regulatory Branch,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 14, 24, (May 9, 2016) [hereinafter
Memorandum for Record]:
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/160509mfruademinimisdetermina
tion.pdf (tribal fishing gear loss from tanker traffic).
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James May, Oil Spill Damages Marine Estuary at Suquamish, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 14, 2004:
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/oil-spill-damages-marine-estuaryat-suquamish/.
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Tribe’s Reservation and treaty fishing waters. 63 The proposed Trans
Mountain expansion of the Kinder Morgan pipeline and export
terminal near Vancouver, British Columbia, for example, would
increase total tanker traffic in the Salish Sea by a factor of seven64
and potentially carry a 16-67% probability of an oil spill over a 50year period.65
Fossil fuel transport vessels require safe places to anchor
before and after loading cargo, and many protected anchorages
intrude on important tribal fishing sites. When the U.S. Coast Guard
proposed a rule in 2017 to expand anchorages and create priority for
“deep-draft vessels” extending over 200 feet in length in greater
Puget Sound, regional tribes submitted public comments and
persuaded the Coast Guard to initiate a formal tribal consultation
process pursuant to its federal Indian trust responsibility.66
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The company responsible for the spill, Foss Maritime, ultimately reached a
settlement with the Suquamish Tribe for “spiritual and cultural damages” to the
tribe’s marsh and beach. Tiffany Royal, Suquamish Tribe Reaches Oil Spill
Settlement, NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHERIES COMMISSION, Feb. 26, 2007:
https://nwifc.org/suquamish-tribe-reaches-oil-spill-settlement/. In addition to
this settlement, the company also made payments for the initial response, the
damage assessment, and the federal restoration and mitigation costs. Id.
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Jason R.W. Merrick and J. Rene van Dorp, “Vessel Traffic Risk Assessment
(VTRA) 2015,” George Washington University, Aug. 9-10, 2016:
http://www2.seas.gwu.edu/~dorpjr/VTRA_2015/PRESENTATIONS/21%20%20COMPARISON%20VTRA%202015%20Case%20KM%20348%20to%20
VTRA%202015%20Base%20Case.pdf.
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See Hearing Order OH-001-2014, National Energy Board, par. 20336, Feb. 5,
2016: https://vancouver.ca/files/cov/trans-mountain-pipeline-expansionproposal-final-argument-transcript.pdf. The permit for Kinder Morgan was
recently denied by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal for failure to properly
consult with First Nations and for failure to address the environmental impacts
of the increase in tanker traffic. See Joan Bryden, Federal Court Quashes Trans
Mountain Expansion; Ottawa Forging Ahead with Purchase, GLOBAL NEWS,
Aug. 31, 2018: https://globalnews.ca/news/4418485/trans-mountain-pipelinequashed-federal-court/. However, typical of fossil fuel infrastructure projects,
the threat is not over as the Canadian government has purchased the project for
$4.5 billion and plans to push ahead for completion of the pipeline expansion.
Id.
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See “Anchorages; Captain of the Port Puget Sound Zone, WA,” 82 Fed. Reg.
10313 (proposed Feb. 10, 2017):
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/10/2017-02683/anchoragescaptain-of-the-port-puget-sound-zone-wa; see also id. § 110.230(b)(1-3). See
“Anchorages; Captain of the Port Puget Sound Zone, WA; Supplemental Notice
of Tribal Consultation,” 82 Fed. Reg. 27639 (proposed June 16, 2017):
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C.  

Tribal Leadership and Vision for a Livable Future

Across the country, tribal leaders and grassroots Native
American communities are unifying to resist the escalating threats
of fossil fuel transport. The unprecedented demonstrations at the
Standing Rock Sioux Reservation in 2016 shaped and shifted the
dialogue around fossil fuel infrastructure, as the world watched
tribal opposition to the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) burgeon
into a national and international social movement. Many thousands
of individuals traveled to Standing Rock to stand in solidarity
against the pipeline over the course of the demonstration—including
2,000 American military veterans and a contingent of Pacific
Northwest tribal representatives who arrived in traditional canoes.67
Rallies in support of the Standing Rock Sioux were held in at least
300 cities around the globe.68 Numerous municipalities
affirmatively divested from the financial institutions underwriting
DAPL.69 Online petitions opposing the pipeline have collected
nearly 1.9 million signatures.70 Standing Rock highlighted the vital
67

See, e.g,. Leah Donnella, “The Standing Rock Resistance is Unprecedented
(It’s Also Centuries Old),” NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 22, 2016:
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2016/11/22/502068751/the-standingrock-resistance-is-unprecedented-it-s-also-centuries-old; Sarah Van Gelder, “In
Photos: Northwest Canoe Tribes Arrive at Historic Gathering at Standing
Rock,” YES! MAGAZINE, Sept. 9, 2016: http://www.yesmagazine.org/peoplepower/in-photos-northwest-canoe-tribes-arrive-at-historic-gathering-at-standingrock-20160909; Michael Edison Hayden, Catherine Thorbecke, & Evan Simon,
“At Least 2,000 Veterans Arrive at Standing Rock to Protect Dakota Pipeline,”
ABC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2016: http://abcnews.go.com/US/2000-veterans-arrivestanding-rock-protest-dakota-pipeline/story?id=43964136.
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“People in 300+ Cities are Taking Part In the #NoDAPL Day of Action,”
COLOR LINES MAGAZINE, Nov. 15, 2016:
https://www.colorlines.com/articles/people-300-cities-are-taking-part-nodaplday-action.
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See, e.g., Jimmy Tobias, “These Cities are Pulling Billions from the Banks
that Support the Dakota Access Pipeline,” THE NATION, March 20, 2017:
https://www.thenation.com/article/these-cities-are-divesting-from-the-banksthat-support-the-dakota-access-pipeline/.
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“Tell President Obama: Stop the Dakota Access Oil Pipeline, #NoDAPL,”
CREDO online petition - 419,164 signatures as of Sept. 20, 2018:
https://act.credoaction.com/sign/NoDAPL/; “Stop the Dakota Access Pipeline
Once and For All - #NoDAPL,” MoveOn.com online petition - 413,259
signatures as of Sept. 20, 2018: http://petitions.moveon.org/sign/no-dapl; “Stop
the Dakota Access Pipeline,” Change.com online petition - 564,464 signatures
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“Stand With Standing Rock,” online petition - 478,201 signatures as of Sept. 20,
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role of tribal leadership at this pivotal ecological moment.71 As
renowned author and climate activist Bill McKibben observed, “The
events at Standing Rock also allow Americans to realize who some
of the nation’s most important leaders really are. The fight for
environmental sanity—against pipelines and coal ports and other
fossil fuel infrastructure—has increasingly been led by Native
Americans . . . .”72
In the Pacific Northwest, a unified coalition of tribal Nations
has passed a series of resolutions opposing fossil fuel transport. The
Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians (ATNI), representing 58
tribal governments in six states across the greater Northwest
region,73 adopted its first resolution against fossil fuel transport in
2013.74 Since then, this powerful league of sovereign tribal
governments has adopted at least nine additional resolutions
expressly declaring Northwest tribes’ opposition to fossil fuel
infrastructure development at large.75 ATNI’s 2017 reaffirmation
Resolution unequivocally states, “ATNI calls upon our federal
trustees to affirm and preserve decisions denying proposals for
unrefined fossil fuel export facilities to date (including coal), and to
take every available and appropriate step to deny proposals for
future transportation or export facilities . . . .”76
In addition to this broad institutional tribal opposition,
individual tribal leaders across the region have articulated a clear
and resounding commitment against fossil fuel transport. Quinault
Indian Nation President Fawn Sharp (former President of ATNI),
71

See Don Gentry & Emma Marris, The Next Standing Rock? A Pipeline Battle
Looms in Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2018:
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/opinion/standing-rock-pipelineoregon.html?smid=pl-share. The Klamath River, which lies within the Klamath
Tribes’ ancestral territory in present day Oregon, has been identified as the “the
next Standing Rock.” Id.
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Bill McKibben, “A Pipeline Fight and America’s Dark Past,” THE NEW
YORKER, Sept. 6, 2016: http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/apipeline-fight-and-americas-dark-past.
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The ATNI represents tribes throughout Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Alaska,
Montana, California. Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, “Tribal
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76
Id.
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stated: “The technology exists to safely and affordably transition
away from fossil fuels . . . . Tools such as the public trust doctrine
and treaty law support such a movement legally and invoke a moral
responsibility for faster, more decisive action.”77 Brian Cladoosby,
Chairman of the Swinomish Tribal Indian Community, said in
regard to his tribe’s easement battle to limit oil-by-rail across its
Reservation: “We as leaders need to protect our treaty resources, our
economies, and the human health of citizens and neighbors. We all
lose if we give up that which is most precious to us all—our
commitment to do what is right for our children and grandchildren,
and protect the land and water upon which their lives will depend.”78
Yakama Chairman JoDe Goudy declared after the oil train
derailment in Mosier, Oregon, in 2016, “We will stand together to
speak for those things that cannot speak for themselves. We will
stand together to protect our lands, our waters and our rights.”79 In
September 2013, Nez Perce Tribal Council members joined arms as
part of a human blockade to stop a “mega-load” of massive drilling
equipment bound for the Alberta tar sands.80 Every year for the past
four years, members of the Lummi Nation have organized an annual
Totem Pole Journey, travelling across the continent with a
traditionally carved pole to “bring attention to proposed fossil fuel
terminals, oil trains, coal trains, and oil pipelines and the threat they
pose to tribes and local communities.”81
Speaking broadly, Native customary law emphasizes
77

Fawn Sharp, “Tribes Have Up Close Perspective on Climate Change,”
SEATTLE TIMES, April 23, 2016: http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/tribeshave-up-close-perspective-on-climate-change/.
78
“Swinomish Tribe Files Suit to Stop Bakken Crude Trains,” Lawsuit Against
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80
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N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/us/fight-overenergy-finds-a-new-front-in-a-corner-of-idaho.html. The Nez Perce Tribe
ultimately prevailed in court, securing an injunction against further mega-loads,
Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2013 WL 5212317 (D. Idaho 2013). See
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Restricts Megaloads,” Jan. 27, 2017:
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humanity’s duty to respect and steward Nature in trust for future
generations,82 recognizing that the laws of Nature are nonnegotiable and set the parameters for human survival.83 Using a
range of legal strategies emanating from traditional values, tribes are
showing success in defeating proposed fossil fuel projects. Tribes
that have won either in court or in administrative proceedings
against fossil fuel transport projects include the Lummi Nation, the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation, the
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, the Swinomish Tribal Indian
Community, the Quinault Indian Nation, the Cowlitz Tribe, and the
Nez Perce Nation, among others. Sections II and III of this Article
draw upon these successes to explore in detail the legal tools
available to tribes to stop fossil fuel transport within tribal
geographies. The section below describes the legal context framing
such strategies.
D.   Legal Posture of Fossil Fuel Transport and Export Projects
Jurisdictional analyses and best available legal tools will
vary depending on whether a proposed project lies within or outside
reservation boundaries. On the reservation, tribes may have direct
jurisdiction over trains or pipelines crossing into tribal territory. Offreservation, tribes may exert considerable sway as interested parties
and sovereign co-trustees in permit decisions controlled by federal,
state, or local agencies. Virtually all proposed fossil fuel projects
pass through tribal geographies (reservations and ceded lands) in
some capacity.
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Rebecca Tsosie, “Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of SelfDetermination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological
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comparative discussion of Euro-American and indigenous land ethics, and they
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“Tribal Trustees in Climate Crisis,” supra note 34, at 526 (citing Oren Lyons,
Onondaga Nation leader and faithkeeper, The Ice is Melting, Twenty-Fourth
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By their nature as projects designed to cover distance,
proposed fossil fuel transport and export projects typically require a
dozen or more permits from a range of jurisdictional authorities.
Every required permit or authorization represents a legal entry point
for tribes to assert their sovereign prerogatives. The precise
configuration of permits and authorizations will necessarily vary by
project according to transport method, fuel type, and route. A single
denial can stop a project cold.
Tribes have a unique opportunity and strong basis to insert
themselves in these permitting processes. First, “bomb trains” and
pipelines directly impinge on tribal property rights. Second, tribes
have special responsibilities as co-trustees of natural resources.84
Water, air, and fisheries are among the public trust assets over which
tribes serve as co-trustees.85 Tribes are statutorily positioned to bring
claims for natural resources damages (NRD) when private or public
actors injure natural assets held in common by all citizens.86 The
following description of agencies and permits frequently involved
in fossil fuel transport provides a useful framework for ascertaining
opportunities for tribal intervention.
1.  

Federal

Given the diversity and reach of the federal government,
federal agencies commonly exercise jurisdiction over at least one
phase of most fossil fuel infrastructure proposals. Projects involving
transportation of coal or oil by rail, for example, will implicate the
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA).87
That statute expressly reserves authority over railroad activities to
84

See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 2005 WL 2488447
*5 (D. Or. 2005) (mandating federal agencies to “collaborate with the sovereign
entities, including . . . the Tribes”).
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See id.; see also Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F.Supp.2d 1094,
1114-15 (D. Idaho, 2003), modified in part, U.S. v. Asarco, Inc., 4471
F.Supp.2d 1063, 1068-69 (D. Idaho, 2005) (recognizing the Coeur d’Alene tribe
as the co-trustee of Lake Coeur d’Alene for purposes of CERCLA); U.S. v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (“The right to resort to the fishing places in
controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the
exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they
breathed.”).
86
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(4) (Oil Pollution Act).
87
49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.
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the federal Surface Transportation Board (STB).88 The STB is
responsible for reviewing permit applications for construction and
acquisition of railway lines.89
Most new construction requiring federal agency approval
obliges these action agencies to engage in the NEPA process.90
Environmental Assessments and especially Environmental Impact
Statements provide an important opportunity for public
participation, though agencies retain discretion in weighing
comments.91 Tribes typically engage in such federal public
comment processes for proposed fossil fuel infrastructure. The
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), crafted to protect
historic structures and places, also requires a public comment
process similar to NEPA.92 Both statutes apply only to federal
actions.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers exercises jurisdiction
over any structures built in, on, or above the navigable waters of the
United States, as well as over any activity that obstructs
navigation.93 Fossil fuel export terminals and port facilities involve
88

49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (announcing, “The jurisdiction of the Board . . . is
exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided
under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and
preempt the remedies provide under Federal or State law.”); 49 U.S.C. §
10102(1) (defining “Board”).
89
49 U.S.C. § 10901 et seq.
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NEPA: “in order to have ‘major federal action,’ . . . ‘the federal agency must
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Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477, 1482 (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
91
Courts generally apply a strict compliance standard to the procedural
requirement of NEPA, while applying an “arbitrary and capricious” standard to
the substantive requirement, essentially deferring to the agency. See, e.g.,
Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council Inc. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980)
(holding that as long as federal agencies consider the environmental
consequences of their decisions, “NEPA requires no more.”). Additionally,
different administrations interpret and apply NEPA differently. See generally
Walter E. Stern, “‘Black Snakes’ or Essential Infrastructure: Dakota Access
Pipeline, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, The
Federal Government’s Tribal Consultation Obligations, and Why This Matters,
MODRALL SPERLING, Jan. 4, 2018:
https://www.modrall.com/2018/01/17/black-snakes-essential-infrastructuredakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux-tribe-v-u-s-army-corps-engineersfederal-governments-tribal-consultation-obligations-m/.
92
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33 U.S.C. § 403.
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such structures and activities, typically triggering an affirmative
obligation for the Army Corps to engage in a full environmental
review process under NEPA. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
gives the Army Corps authority to regulate discharge and fill
material in navigable waters.94 Section 401 requires certification of
compliance with state water quality standards.95
Other federal agencies that are likely to exercise jurisdiction
over various stages or types of fossil fuel transport and export
projects include: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; the
U.S. Department of Energy; the U.S. Department of Transportation
and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration;
the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; NOAA
Fisheries Service; and the U.S. Department of State, among others.
Each federal agency owes a fiduciary trust responsibility to tribes
and is responsible for upholding this obligation in all decisions
implicating tribal interests.96
2.  

State

At the state level, Washington and Oregon both have
extensive administrative frameworks relevant to fossil fuel transport
permit processes in the Pacific Northwest. In Washington, state
agencies likely to be involved in reviewing fossil fuel project permit
applications include Washington’s Departments of Ecology, Natural
Resources, Fish and Wildlife, and Commerce, as well as the Energy
Facility Site Evaluation Council (EFSEC), which is specially
charged with reviewing permit applications for facilities receiving
oil by rail. The EFSEC makes a recommendation to the Governor,
who has final say in approving or denying permits.97 On January 29,
2018, Governor Jay Inslee affirmed EFSEC’s recommendation to
reject an application for Tesoro-Savage’s proposed oil-by-rail
terminal in Vancouver, Washington.98
94

33 U.S.C. § 1344.
33 U.S.C. § 1341.
96
See infra Section IV.A.; Parravano v. Babbit, 70 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 2000)
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Oregon’s state bureaucratic roster reads somewhat
differently than its northern neighbor, though the permit hurdles
which proposed projects must clear are similar. The State Land
Board (SLB) and the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
are important gatekeepers in Oregon, charged with issuing land use
permits on state-owned land and water quality certifications,
respectively. The SLB and its administrative arm, the Department
of State Lands (DSL), maintain jurisdiction over all proposed
development within wetlands and waterways. In 2014, the DSL
terminated a proposed coal transport project when it denied a
removal-fill permit on the middle Columbia, citing a “small but
important longstanding fishery” for which treaty tribes had
advocated for.99
Washington (unlike Oregon) has enacted a State
Environmental Policy Act (SEPA),100 which requires a NEPA-like
procedural analysis of state actions and permit decisions.
Washington’s SEPA was the basis of the Department of Ecology’s
recent denial of a permit application for a proposed coal-by-rail
terminal in Longview, Washington.101 Oregon has never passed a
state environmental policy act, though other state laws, such as those
governing removal-fill permits, set forth robust environmental
policies emphasizing protection, conservation, recreation, and
habitat.102
Washington and Oregon are also the two longest-standing
state participants in the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).103
In this capacity, both states have developed and implemented coastal
zone management plans to carry out the national policy of
preserving, protecting, and sustainably developing coastal zones
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http://www.millenniumbulk.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/401-WQCertification-Denial-Letter.pdf.
102
See, e.g., ORS 196.805(1).
103
16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq.; see “Coastal Zone Management Programs,”
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION:
https://coast.noaa.gov/czm/mystate/.
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“for this and succeeding generations.”104 The statutory scheme
provides yet another avenue for tribes to work with and through
states in exerting their sovereign interests in protecting coastal and
ocean resources against fossil fuel infrastructure.
Finally, both states also observe and enforce the public trust
doctrine, which is unequivocally implicated by any fossil fuel
infrastructure proposal involving submerged lands along navigable
waterways. Under the public trust doctrine, all submerged lands
along navigable waterways are owned by the State in trust for
present and future citizens as beneficiaries, and state decisionmakers must uphold fiduciary obligations under the public trust
when administering and making decisions on all leases and permits
involving the seashore, submerged lands, and overlying waters.105
Not coincidentally, the physical scope of the public trust overlaps
substantially with tribal treaty fishing waters, indicating the crucial
nature of the aquatic commons to all citizens. Tribes should consider
the public trust doctrine among the array of tools available for
stopping fossil fuel transport projects that threaten tribal people,
resources, and lands.
3.  

Local

Local jurisdictions also exercise authority over aspects of
proposed fossil fuel projects. Port and county commissions are the
governmental bodies most likely to hold sway at the local level
through their authority over construction and expansion permits for
export facilities. While local governments may not always share the
same policies or priorities as tribes, formidable alliances may form
over common fossil fuel infrastructure threats to communities. In
2016, for example, the Board of Commissioners of Wasco County,
Oregon, denied a railway expansion permit based on projected
impacts to tribal treaty fishing rights.106 Cultural resource law has
104

16 U.S.C. § 1452(a); see also Washington Coastal Zone Management, WA
Dept. of Ecology: https://ecology.wa.gov/Water-Shorelines/Shoreline-coastalmanagement/Coastal-zone-management; Oregon Coastal Management Program,
https://www.oregon.gov/LCD/OCMP/pages/cstzone_intro.aspx. Moreover, in
Oregon, the public trust encompasses all beaches up to the high-water mark. See
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131, 138-9 (1993) (quoting State ex
rel. Thorton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 588-596 (1969)).
105
See Stevens, 317 Or. at 138-9.
106
For a detailed discussion of this case, see infra Section IV.B.2.c.
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also delayed local permitting for development of a proposed
liquefied natural gas facility in Coos Bay, Oregon.107 Local
jurisdictional authority has the benefit of devolving power over
dangerous infrastructure to those who, like tribes themselves, face
direct harm from proposed fossil fuel projects.
Ultimately, arresting proposed fossil fuel projects involves
an exercise in braiding the law. Tribal rights, statutory language, and
common law doctrines such as the public trust must be woven
together into innovative, sophisticated legal arguments. Tribes stand
positioned to assert their sovereign legal prerogatives by denying or
negotiating easements, invoking the federal Indian trust
responsibility and treaty rights, appealing directly to jurisdictional
decision-makers, and, when necessary, challenging those decisions
in court. The precise contours of legal levers available to halt fossil
fuel transport on-reservation and off-reservation is the focus of the
next two Sections of this Article.
III.   ON-RESERVATION TRIBAL PREROGATIVES
Tribes, as unique legal sovereigns, hold on-reservation
levers against fossil fuel projects unavailable to state or local
governments. These levers can be viewed through two distinct
frameworks: those derived from property rights and those stemming
from the inherent tribal authority to regulate as sovereigns.
Through the property rights lever, tribes can exert power
over fossil fuel export projects by exercising control over the
easement agreements that allow the projects to cross the reservation.
The regulatory lever, on the other hand, allows tribes to more
directly control projects through the application of tribal law. An
example of direct regulation would be a tribal ordinance stating that
no trains transporting crude oil shall pass through the tribe's
reservation boundaries.
Tribes likely possess the most effective means of stopping
these projects on-reservation by operating within the property
framework and using the rules prescribed by the regulations. Every
fossil fuel export project that crosses reservation lands will require
an easement, which is granted by the Secretary of the Interior to third
107

Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. Coos County, LUBA No. 2016095, 43-53, Nov. 27, 2017:
http://www.oregon.gov/LUBA/docs/Opinions/2017/11-17/16095.pdf.
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parties through statutory processes. Under the implementing
regulations for that statute, however, tribes may refuse, revoke, or
enforce easement agreements. This article will explore those options
in Section A, and Section B will analyze the potential of direct
regulation through tribal law and discuss the federal preemption
barriers that such regulation will likely face.
To preface this discussion, several items should be noted.
First, any individualized analysis must tie to a highly fact-specific
context. Each right-of-way grant will have unique language.
Moreover, treaty rights interpretations, as well as the history and
status of particular tribal land holdings, differ between tribes.
Second, some of these matters are still laden with uncertainty. A
multitude of laws remain at play, and on-point precedent is often
elusive. While not providing hard-and-fast answers, this section
provides guidance for tribes exercising on-reservation prerogatives
by highlighting relevant case law, identifying probable obstacles to
the assertion of tribal authority, and describing potential pathways
around those obstacles.
A.   Tribal Property Rights Tools
Right-of-way easements through reservations are governed
by specific statutes and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) regulations.
These laws offer significant leverage to tribes seeking to exercise
dominion over easements. Caselaw dealing with these issues is
sparse, but the language in the regulations provides tribes with
significant control.
This section begins by describing the federal scheme that
governs rights-of-way through tribal lands. It then reviews potential
property rights levers operating within the regulations. These levers
function against both new right-of-way applications and existing
grants. Finally, this section concludes with a discussion of
Swinomish v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, a
recent case that has affirmed tribal power in this context.
1.  

Federal Law over Rights-of-Way

All infrastructure poised to cross over an Indian reservation
requires a right-of-way from the tribe, whether that infrastructure is
a telecommunications line, water pipe, or railroad. Federal laws
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governing rights-of-way through tribal lands historically favored
non-Indian economic development.108 The Secretary of the Interior
has long held the ultimate power to grant right-of-way easements in
Indian Country. Originally, that power derived from a handful of
piecemeal right-of-way statutes.109 In 1948, however, Congress
passed sweeping legislation enabling rights-of-way for any use or
purpose, including pipelines and railroad tracks. Commonly called
the Indian Right-of-Way Act (or IRWA),110 the statute conferred
broad authority to the Secretary of the Interior to grant easements,
subject to a requirement for consent from the affected tribe.111 The
newest iteration of the implementing regulations, published in 2016,
suggests that the longtime trend of placing tribal interests
subordinate to non-Indian development interests may be receding.
Purpose of the New Right-of-Way Regulations: BIA's
purpose in updating the IRWA regulations was to “streamline the
procedures and conditions” for application and approval of a rightof-way grant.112 The regulations apply to all right-of-way grants
issued on or after April 21, 2016.113 For grants issued prior to that
date, the procedural provisions apply retroactively, unless those
provisions are incompatible with the express terms of the grant.114
The new rules are meant to bolster tribal self-determination
by “acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies” and
by deferring to tribal decisions wherever possible.115 Such language
makes clear a policy to respect the sovereign authority of tribes in
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See, e.g., Ward Churchill & Winona LaDuke, Native America: The Political
Economy of Radioactive Colonialism, 13 The Journal of Ethnic Studies (Fall
1985).
109
25 U.S.C.A. § 311-22. Strangely, IRWA made clear that the prior right-ofway statutes would not be repealed. In hindsight, this preservation of the older
statutes has only added confusion to the already unclear scheme of federal
dominion over tribal easements.
110
25 U.S.C.A. § 324.
111
25 U.S.C.A. § 324 (consent required for tribes organized under Indian
Reorganization Act); see also Coast Indian Community v. U.S., 550 F.2d 639
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs violated the law sold
right-of-way over Indian lands without obtaining consent of majority of adult
members of Indian community).
112
25 C.F.R. § 169.1.
113
25 C.F.R. § 169.7(a).
114
25 C.F.R. § 169.7(b). For a list of procedural regulation provisions,
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/idc1-033661.pdf.
115
25 C.F.R. § 169.7(b).
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choosing whether to allow these projects to carve through tribal
lands.116
Obtaining a Right-of-Way: To obtain a right-of-way
easement, the applicant, or grantee, must submit an application to
the regional BIA office.117 The BIA must determine if the right-ofway is in the best interest of the tribe.118 As a predicate to the
decision, BIA must analyze any potential environmental or other
adverse impacts and confirm that the proposed easement complies
with applicable federal laws.119 Significantly, BIA must defer “to
the maximum extent possible” to the tribe on whether the right-ofway is in its best interest.120
Consent Requirements for Right-of-Ways: Most
importantly, the regulations underscore a clear tribal consent
requirement and clarify the tribe's authority over how that consent
is negotiated.121 Consent is required for any new easement that
crosses “tribal land.”122 Consent must come as an authorization from
the tribe or, if the tribe requires, as a written agreement with the
tribe.123 Apart from new right-of-way applications, the consent
requirement may also be triggered by a number of actions on
existing easements: new uses, amendments, assignments, and
renewals elaborated below.
New Uses under Existing Easements Agreements:
Easement holders can utilize their existing rights-of-way for a new
use under certain circumstances, without obtaining tribal consent.124
116

The agency's position is also apparent from its filings in a suit challenging the
new regulations, discussed infra in FN 141.
117
25 C.F.R. § 169.101(a).
118
25 C.F.R. § 169.124.
119
25 C.F.R. § 169.123.
120
25 C.F.R. § 169.124.
121
Although IRWA only required consent from tribes organized under IRA, the
regulations made clear that the consent requirement applies to all tribes. 25
C.F.R. § 169.107. See also Kevin K. Washburn & Jody Cummings, “Explaining
the Modernized Leasing and Right-of-Way Regulations for Indian Lands,”
University of New Mexico School of Law Research Paper No. 2017-10:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055854.
122
25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a). Tribal land is defined as any tract where a tribe owns
at least an undivided interest in the surface estate in trust or restricted status. 25
C.F.R. § 169.2. Under that definition, the regulations seemingly expand the
requirement from applying only to trust lands to also applying to fee land in
which a tribe has an undivided ownership interest.
123
25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a).
124
25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a). “An example of uses within the same scope would be
an underground telephone line being used for an underground fiber optic line. A
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Grantees may use existing easements for a use not stipulated in the
original grant as long as the original grant has not yet expired, the
new use is “within the same scope” as the original use, and no
ground disturbance is necessary.125 On the other hand, if the new
uses are not within the same scope of the original easement and
involve ground disturbance, such change would require a brand-new
application, triggering the consent requirement.126
Amendments to Existing Easement Agreements:127
Grantees can also make certain changes to their easements through
amendments, at any point in the lifetime of the grant.128 However, if
a proposed amendment makes any material changes, the BIA may
instead require an application for a new grant.129 Further, even if the
proposed amendment lacks material changes, tribal consent must be
obtained unless the amendments are merely administrative changes,
such as correcting a legal description within the grant document.130
The BIA can only disapprove an amendment request if: consent (if
required) has not been obtained; the grantee has violated the original
grant; the BIA finds a “compelling reason” for withholding approval
to protect the tribe's best interest (the agency must defer to the
maximum extent possible to the tribe); or any other requirements of
the regulations have not been met.131
Renewals of Easement Agreements: Easements are
granted for a definite period of time, as specified in the grant
document, and the BIA will defer to the tribe's determination on
pipeline easement being used for a railroad, on the other hand, is not within the
same scope.” Id. at (c).
125
25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a). This action is attractive to grantees because it does
not require the resources necessary for a brand-new application.
126
25 C.F.R. § 169.127(a)(2).
127
The regulations also prescribe rules for assignments of existing grants.
Assignments are used when a grantee wants to transfer their right-of-way
interest to another actor. As with amendments, the regulations require tribal
consent for assignments, unless the express terms of the grant provide otherwise.
Even with such terms, however, the BIA may still need to approve the
assignment. The disapproval factors for assignments are nearly identical to the
amendment factors. 25 C.F.R. § 169.207. Note that assignments with new
proposed uses may also require a new grant application. 25 C.F.R. § 169.127(b).
128
For example, new uses outside the scope of the original grant that will not
require ground disturbance may only require an amendment. 25 C.F.R. §
169.127(a)(1).
129
25 C.F.R. § 169.204(a).
130
25 C.F.R. § 169.204(b).
131
25 C.F.R. § 169.206. BIA notes in this provision that the agency will not
“unreasonably withhold approval of an amendment.”
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whether the original right-of-way term is reasonable.132 Once the
right-of-way term expires, the grantee may renew the existing
grant.133
However, a renewal will only be granted if several
conditions are met: the initial and renewal term do not cumulatively
exceed the maximum term under the regulations; the existing grant
explicitly allows for renewal and specifies compensation terms; the
grantee provides an affidavit stating that there is no change in rightof-way size, type, or location; there are no uncured violations under
the regulations or the existing grant's terms; the grantee confirms
that consent has been obtained (or, if the original right-of-way
explicitly allows for renewal without consent, the grantee has
provided notice to the tribe); and the initial right-of-way term has
not already expired. 134 If any of these conditions are not met, the
grantee must reapply for a new right-of-way, and the BIA must
handle the application as a new right-of-way application that
requires tribal consent.135
Negotiating for Conditions, Restrictions, Remedies, and
Compensation: Tribes have significant negotiating power with
respect to right-of-ways that trigger the consent requirement. The
consent agreement may impose conditions or restrictions on the
right-of-way grant.136 The consent document may also include
negotiated remedies for violations, such as termination of the
grant.137 If the remedies provide the tribe or the grantee with the
power to terminate the grant, then BIA approval of termination is
not required; if an express negotiated remedy for termination is not
included, then BIA approval is necessary.138 The tribe also has the
power to negotiate the monetary compensation that will be paid by
the grantee for the right-of-way.139
132

25 C.F.R. § 169.201.
25 C.F.R. § 169.202.
134
25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a).
135
25 C.F.R. § 169.202(c).
136
Id.
137
25 C.F.R. § 169.403(a).
138
Id.
139
25 C.F.R. § 169.110(a). The compensation can be “any payment amount
negotiated by the tribe.” The BIA will defer to the tribe's valuation if the tribe
submits an authorization expressly stating that it has agreed to satisfactory
compensation, waives the BIA valuation process, and has determined that
accepting the agreed upon compensation and waiving BIA valuation is in its best
interest.
133
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2.  

Property Rights Levers Using IRWA and the Regulations

The new regulations, while far from perfect, do offer
potential leverage for tribes through the consent requirement.140 The
need for consent may be triggered at various times through the
lifetime of an easement and can essentially act as a tribal veto power.
Whether or not tribal consent is needed, the BIA remains
obligated to act in accordance with the trust obligation, as reflected
in the regulatory language requiring decisions that protect the “best
interests” of the tribe. The trust obligation permeates all federal
agency discretionary actions, including right-of way decisions.141
Even in those instances where the tribal consent requirement is not
triggered, there is a manifest policy throughout the regulations to
promote consultation with tribes, and defer to their decisions.142 The
next subsections will review in more detail the tribal role in projects
crossing reservations. Subsection (a) considers new applications,
while subsection (b) discusses existing grants.
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Importantly, tribal claims that are based off noncompliance with the
regulations, such as failure to obtain consent, should not be defeated by a
preemption-style challenge. Although existing federal regulation of fossil fuel
transport is overarching and may have limited tribal authority to directly
regulate using tribal law, the right-of-way regulations operate under IRWA.
Federal statutes do not preempt one another, and there is no indication that
IRWA has been implicitly repealed. Instead, Congress's failure to repeal IRWA
demonstrates its intent to allow tribes to pursue IRWA-based remedies despite
the overarching federal regulation. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v.
BNSF Railway Company, 228 F.Supp.3d 1171, 1180-3 (W.D. Wash. 2017).
141
“It is well established that the BIA holds a fiduciary relationship to Indian
tribes, and its management of tribal rights-of-way is subject to the same
fiduciary duties.” McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530, 538 (9th Cir. 2002).
142
See 25 C.F.R. § 169.1(a) (stating that these regulations are intended to also
intended to support tribal self-determination and self-governance by
acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies in processing a request
for a right-of-way across tribal lands and defer to the maximum extent possible
to Indian landowner decisions regarding their Indian land.”); see also: 25 C.F.R.
§ 169.209(b) (stating that BIA will defer to the tribe, even where tribal consent
is not necessary, in determining whether to approve a right-of-way assignment);
25 C.F.R. § 169.206(b) (stating that BIA will defer to the tribe, even where
tribal consent is not necessary, in determining whether to approve a right-of-way
amendment); 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(1) (stating that, in determining whether to
grant a right-of-way renewal, BIA will defer to the tribe on whether the length
of renewal is reasonable, regardless of whether consent is required).
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a.  

New Right-of-Way Grant Applications

Tribes hold the greatest leverage against proposed projects
that will require a new right-of-way grant to pass through the
reservation, due to the consent requirement. Without consent, there
can be no new pipeline or rail line built across tribal land.143 The
BIA cannot consent on behalf of a tribe, and the Secretary cannot
grant a right-of-way without consent.144 Thus, the tribe holds an
absolute power over projects that do not already have grants.
If a tribe does not wish to refuse consent outright, the
regulations provide an opportunity for it to nevertheless retain
significant control over an easement. Written consent agreements
can contractually impose conditions and restrictions, including the
type or amount of fuel transported through the easement area.145
Moreover, the tribe increases control over these projects by
including negotiated remedies for violating the terms of the written
agreement. In particular, unilateral termination without BIA
approval allows a tribe to cancel the right-of-way agreement at any
time, though enforcement may pose a challenge.146 BIA's trust
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25 C.F.R. §169.107(a).
25 C.F.R. § 169.108(a); 25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a).
145
Typically, breach of contract claims based on easement agreement conditions
that de facto regulate may be preempted because of their potential effect on
interstate commerce (U. S. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 333 U.S. 169, 176 (U.S.
1948), holding that noncarrier regulation of cargo type through contract with a
rail carrier is preempted Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
(ICCTA), even when the noncarrier owns the track itself, not merely the land
crossed by easement). See also, Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Maine Cent. R.
Co., 297 F.Supp.2d 326, 333 (D. Me. 2003), holding that a breach of contract
claim for “exemplary” damages was preempted by the ICCTA). However, this
rule should not apply in this context. Through IRWA, Congress has expressly
granted the Secretary of Interior authority to promulgate regulations specific to
right-of-way agreements through tribal lands. Through that authority, the
Secretary has created a process for tribes to impose conditions and restrictions
on easement consent agreements. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v.
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company, 2017 WL 2483071, 1 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).
146
The written agreements may also contain negotiations for compensation
between the tribe and the grantee. The monetary negotiations form an additional
possible lever. The regulations explicitly provide that this can be “any payment
amount negotiated by the tribe” and that the BIA will give deference to the
tribe's valuation. 25 C.F.R. § 169.110(a). In theory, the tribe could negotiate for
an amount so obscenely high that no company, no matter how well funded,
would be willing to pay for rights to cross over a relatively small piece of land.
It is a bit unclear what would happen in this scenario, as the regulations state
144
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obligation to act in a tribe's best interests should compel the agency
to support and enforce tribally-proposed conditions, restrictions, and
negotiated remedies that mirror the trust obligation owed by the
agency to the tribe. Given the clarity of the IRWA regulations,
prospective grantees would have difficulty challenging a tribe that
withheld consent.
b.  

Existing Right-of-Way Easements

Existing right-of-way easements demand a different
analysis, because many provisions in the IRWA regulations are
prospective only, applying to projects initiated after the regulations
took effect.147 Moreover, the express terms of the applicable grant
will always govern the particular situation.148 Although the
prospective-only regulations and the binding nature of existing grant
terms do present obstacles, tribes still hold potential levers against
existing grants. Those spring from regulatory provisions controlling
renewal, assignment, and changes (including both minor
amendments and material changes in use) of existing easement
agreements.149

that if agreement is not reached then BIA will require the grantee to pay the fair
market value. 25 C.F.R. § 169.110(c).
147
This was necessary, perhaps, for the BIA to avoid a flurry of challenges
arguing that existing property interests had been altered by the regulations. One
such challenge has already been attempted, albeit unsuccessfully. Western
Energy Alliance (WEA), an organization of individuals “involved in all aspects
of exploration, production, and transportation of oil and natural gas on federal
and Indian lands”, brought a claim in federal court to invalidate the regulations.
Order, Western Energy Alliance v. United States Department of Interior, Case
no. 1:16-cv-050, 2 (D.N.D. 2016) [hereinafter WEA Order]. WEA's primary
argument was that the regulations are contrary to federal Indian law principles
and improperly altered property rights on existing easements. Id. at 3. The Dept.
of Interior countered that the regulations were consistent with federal court
decisions regarding tribal jurisdiction and did not affect existing property
interests. Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Western
Energy Alliance v. United States Department of Interior, Case no. 1:16-cv-050,
21 (D.N.D. 2016). WEA's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, and
the organization voluntarily dismissed their suit. See WEA Order, at 15. These
documents available through PACER.
148
These terms could undermine tribal power, such as terms providing
automatic renewal without consent or an absolute waiver of tribal jurisdiction
over the right-of-way.
149
See 25 C.F.R. § 169.202, 25 C.F.R. § 169.127, and 25 C.F.R. § 169.204.
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Perhaps most notably, tribes retain the power to refuse to
renew an easement grant upon expiration.150 The provisions
governing renewals are procedural, thereby applying retroactively
to existing grants.151 Barring any express terms for automatic
renewal without consent, the BIA must disapprove of a renewal
unless the grantee obtains consent from the tribe.152 Further, if the
original grant was silent to renewals altogether, then a brand-new
right-of-way application will be necessary, triggering the consent
requirement discussed above and affording the tribe the opportunity
to negotiate a written agreement with conditions and restrictions.153
The BIA must also disapprove renewal requests where there is a
change in the easement's size, type, or location, where the original
grant has already expired, or where there are any outstanding grant
violations.154 Lastly, the BIA may not approve a renewal if the
aggregate lease or right of way term is considered unreasonable
under the regulations.155 The regulations state that BIA must defer
to the tribe on the question of reasonableness.156 If any of these
procedural obstacles materialize, existing infrastructure would be
subject to removal, as any possession or use without a right-of-way
grant warrants treatment as trespass by the BIA.157
A proactive approach is key in the context of existing rightsof-way. For tribes seeking to extinguish existing grants, tribal
attorneys must determine when each grant expires and what the
terms prescribe for renewal. Grantees, and perhaps even the BIA,
are unlikely to alert a tribe of a grant's approaching expiration,
particularly in this era in which many tribes are demonstrating
opposition to these fossil fuel projects.
In an interesting application of the IRWA regulations, the
Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians in
2017 refused to renew an easement for the Enbridge Line 5 through
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25 C.F.R. § 169.202.
Id.; see also “What are PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS of the Rights-of-Way
on Indian Land Final Rule?” at 4:
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/idc1-033661.pdf.
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25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(6).
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25 C.F.R. § 169.202(c).
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25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(3); 25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(4); 25 C.F.R. §
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25 C.F.R. § 169.202(a)(1).
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25 C.F.R. § 169.201(b).
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certain parcels of its reservation.158 The particular easement
agreement covered only a small portion of the pipeline that crosses
the reservation, and the remaining easements were not due to expire
for quite some time.159 Though it is too early to determine whether
the refusal will block transport of oil through the entire pipeline, the
tribe broadcast a powerful message through its spokesman who
stated: “No form of compensation or negotiations will change our
decision…It’s not about the money. It’s about the environment and
what we leave behind for our next generations.”160
A grantee’s attempt to assign an easement presents another
lever over existing rights-of-way. Tribal consent must be obtained
for assignments, unless the express terms of the grant provide
otherwise.161 Even where the grant expressly provides for
assignment without tribal consent, the BIA still must approve the
assignment, and that approval process necessarily invokes the trust
obligation.162 This broad federal obligation is captured by language
directing BIA to reject an assignment to “protect the best interests”
of the tribe, and to defer as much as possible to the tribe's position.163
The language bears the indicia of a classic trust relationship. Thus,
if relatively benign right-of-way grantee, such as an operator of a
water line, seeks to assign its grant to an oil pipeline company, the
tribe likely can prevent such an assignment, either by refusing its
consent or by imploring the BIA to honor the trust obligation, defer
to the tribe's refusal, and disapprove the assignment.164
Changes in the grant carry similar potential for the exercise
of tribal sovereignty. Changes can range from minor clerical
158

See Karen Graham, Spills on Enbridge’s Old Line 5 Pipeline Tops One
Million Gallons, DIGITAL JOURNAL, Apr. 26, 2017:
http://www.digitaljournal.com/news/environment/spills-on-enbridge-s-old-line5-pipeline-tops-one-million-gallons/article/491245.
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See Danielle Kaeding, Bad River Band Won’t Renew Land Easements With
Enbridge, BUSINESSNORTH, Jan. 9, 2017:
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25 C.F.R. § 169.207(a)(1).
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25 C.F.R. § 169.207(b).
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25 C.F.R. § 169.209.
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An interesting quandary arises when the opposite scenario occurs, with BIA
denying a right of way after the tribe approves it, on the grounds that the right of
way would harm the tribe’s ecological or other interests. This circumstance is
not the focus of this article, but does underscore the complexity of the federal
trust obligation.
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amendments in the grant to a material change in use. The former
category would not require tribal consent, but the latter would
require at least BIA approval, if not complete tribal consent.165 The
approval considerations for amendments mirror the trust language
used for assignment approval, exposing the grantee to possible
denial.
As to changes in use, it is worthy of note that an unauthorized
use amounts to a violation of the right-of-way grant and constitutes
trespass, meaning that the BIA may—and under the trust obligation
must—take action to recover possession of the easement and pursue
any other available remedies.166 Drawing from established
principles outside of the federal Indian law context, significant
changes in use implicate traditional property law concepts regarding
easements. Under these concepts, a user violates its easement when
using the land for a use not specified in the original agreement or
grant.167 The unstipulated use is said to be an “adverse” one,
meaning a “wrongful use, made without the express or implied
permission of the owner of the land.”168 Adverse uses “exceed the
scope” of the original easement and create an undue burden on the
easement, which may compel a forfeiture by the user.169 In this
event, forfeiture should revert the land back to the tribe.170
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that a change in
use may mean a change in the frequency of use, rather than the type
of use. There is already at least one notable example of such
unauthorized use, where a railroad allegedly ramped up the
frequency of trains carrying oil through a reservation without
notifying the tribe, despite a requirement for notice in the terms of
the easement.171 The next subsection analyzes the litigation that
ensued.
3.   Case Study on Enforcement of Existing Easement
Agreements: Swinomish v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe
165
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In 2015, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (the tribe)
brought suit against Burlington North Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad
company, claiming that BNSF had violated an easement agreement
with the tribe.172 The tribe asserted that BNSF unilaterally chose to
start moving 100-car oil trains through the right-of-way, allegedly
violating its obligation under the easement grant to both inform and
receive approval by the tribe before increasing train traffic.173
BNSF conceded that a breach of the easement occurred.174
Its argument, however, was that an immediate injunctive remedy
was unavailable from a federal court, because the Surface
Transportation Board (STB) was the proper entity to initially hear
disputes that could potentially stop rail traffic.175 Therefore, BNSF
argued, any remedies from federal court are preempted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA),
which created the STB. Further, it concluded that the ICCTA
usurped any authority to proceed under the previously enacted
IRWA for easement violations.176
Ultimately, the court found that there was no preemption
issue between ICCTA and IRWA, as federal statutes do not preempt
one another.177 Although the two statutes do intersect and at times
conflict, any potential conflict is not “irreconcilable” to point of
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BNSF Motion to Dismiss or Stay, at 15. The Interstate Commerce
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held, preempted any injunctive relief under these claims. The court drew from
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enforcing state contract claims through an injunction if that injunction would
burden commerce by interrupting rail traffic. Id. at 1179. The tribe successfully
motioned for reconsideration based on this error, and the court issued a second,
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Id. at 1180.
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repealing IRWA.178 In fact, there is no clear or even implicit
indication that federal railroad law has repealed IRWA. The ICCTA
did not mention IRWA, despite IRWA predating it significantly.179
Furthermore, the STB has repeatedly recognized the Bureau of
Indian Affairs' primary role in handling disputes over rights-of-way
between tribes and grantees.180 Finally, the Secretary of the Interior
made clear that the IRWA regulations applied to railway rights-ofway.181 Therefore, any contract or trespass remedies available to
tribes under IRWA are not foreclosed merely because the right-ofway at issue belongs to a railroad regulated by the STB.182
Enforcing the easement, the tribe asserted treaty rights in the
land underlying the railroad tracks,183 thereby prompting a question
of whether the ICCTA abrogated the tribe’s treaty right of exclusive
use.184. The court recognized that such treaty rights remain on equal
footing with statutes.185 Given the ICCTA’s lack of express
abrogation language and the presumption against implicit
divestment of treaty rights, the court concluded that the ICCTA did
not affect the tribe's treaty right.187 When the ICCTA was enacted,
many railroads crossed reservation lands—yet Congress failed to
mention any conflict with treaty rights in the ICCTA, a factor
weighing against abrogation. The IRWA, on the other hand,
expressly recognized the intersection of railroads and treaties,
making clear that unauthorized uses constitute trespass.188 In sum,
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the Swinomish court held that the tribe could proceed with its claims
without facing any preemption by federal railroad regulation.
It is important to note at this juncture that an IRWA statutory
claim of unauthorized use is distinct from a treaty claim asserting an
inherent and unabrogated right to exclude non-tribal members from
the reservation. Tribal attorneys should exercise caution in basing
claims solely on a treaty right to exclude, because, as discussed
below, the Supreme Court has suggested that this right may have
been abrogated, at least in part, in the context of right-of-way
easements.189 But despite the murkiness surrounding the treaty right
to exclude—and Swinomish’s failure to sort out the confusion—the
case makes clear that, under IRWA, unauthorized easement use
amounts to a trespass, and tribes may seek redress in federal court
to prevent that trespass. That statutory proposition (grounded in the
IRWA), unlike the treaty-based right to exclude, which may have
been limited by the Supreme Court.190 By leaving IRWA intact,
Congress demonstrated that tribal right-of-way claims are unique.
IRWA granted the Secretary of the Interior (through BIA) authority
to prescribe right-of-way regulations, and those regulations provide
mechanisms for tribes to pursue when easement agreements are
violated. Because rights-of-ways invoke BIA’s trust obligation, any
grant of exclusive authority to other agencies, such as the STB,
would be improper.
The Swinomish case is still in its early stages, and the rulings
thus far may be overturned or limited on appeal, so it remains
difficult to predict what effect the decision will have on tribal rightsof-way.191 Nevertheless, the case represents a positive legal
development for tribes, in that a court has affirmed a tribe’s ability
to exercise dominion over a right-of-way easement through its own
189

“[S]o long as that [easement] is maintained as part of the State's highway,
they cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude.” Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 440 (U.S. 1997). Nevertheless, this statement
specifically references the landowner right to exclude, rather than a treaty right
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treaty rights, such as the right to hunting and fishing, may be implicated by a
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reconsideration of the issue. See Swinomish III.
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lands. Such an affirmation empowers tribes, by asserting their
property rights, to address the threat from irresponsible fossil fuel
transport. The potential implications for tribes, energy extractors
and transporters, and federal agencies are far-reaching.
B.  

Tribal Regulatory Tools

The prior section discussed property-based tools available to
a tribe to limit or prevent fossil fuel transportation through its
reservation. The other framework that exists within the reservation
boundaries is direct tribal regulation action, stemming from inherent
governmental authority to pass laws that regulate conduct within
sovereign boundaries.192 Tribes, as the original sovereign nations of
this continent, have historically used regulatory systems to ensure
that natural resources are sustained and protected. In the context of
modern fossil fuel projects on reservations, direct regulation would
likely be applied through tribal laws prescribing rules and
limitations on fossil fuel transport within the tribe's jurisdiction.
Such rules might include, for example, a moratorium against rail
transport of oil or a requirement to use the best available technology
for pipeline leak prevention. This approach is quite distinct from
(but complimentary to) one asserting property rights.
Direct tribal regulation would seem to be much more
straightforward and absolute than working within the property
easement framework.193 However, this area faces preemption
obstacles in federal court. While there is no bright-line rule against
tribal regulation, tribal authority over easements and, more
specifically, fossil fuel transport, has been somewhat diminished by
judicial characterizations of easements over reservation and trust
192

The “Treatment as States” provisions of several federal environmental laws,
such as the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.A. § 1377), also equip tribes with
powerful regulatory tools in this context. Treatment as states provisions allow
federal agencies to treat tribes as states for purposes of applicable federal laws,
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reservation—thus making regulatory outcomes contingent on property
ownerships. Tribal governments and attorneys must assess the riskiness of
asserting such regulatory authority, as an unfavorable court decision could strip
tribes of regulatory authority in this context entirely.
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lands as being equivalent to easements over non-Indian fee land.
Tribal regulatory authority over fossil fuel projects encounters the
preemptive nature of overarching federal legislative control in this
area, which may in some circumstances exclude tribal authority.
This section explores such limitations on tribal regulatory
power. It begins by analyzing whether tribes retain the inherent
authority to regulate fossil fuel infrastructure over easements
passing through reservations. It then examines the relevant federal
legislation that expressly limits tribal authority. Finally, it briefly
considers whether the Dormant Commerce Clause operates to
thwart tribal regulation.
1.  

Authority to Regulate

For a tribe seeking to use direct regulation to protect its
natural resources and the health of its members from the harm posed
by fossil fuel infrastructure, the first inquiry is a foundational one:
does the tribe possess basic authority to regulate?
This question is deceptively simple and depends largely on
property ownership. Tribes generally have inherent authority to
assert jurisdiction over their reservation and trust lands in civil and,
to some extent, criminal matters.194 Civil authority largely extends
over nonmembers. As the Supreme Court declared in Montana v.
United States, “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations.”195 However, tribal authority does not indefinitely
extend to nonmembers on “non-Indian fee land” that has been
transferred out of trust and into non-tribal member fee ownership
through an act of Congress.196 A complicated patchwork of authority
exists on many reservations, often making jurisdictional analyses
rather difficult.
Tribal regulation of fossil fuel infrastructure will likely
entail regulation over right-of-way land, given that these projects
almost always require an easement as discussed in the previous
194
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Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 565 (U.S. 1981) [hereinafter Montana].
Nevada v. Hicks did prohibit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on trust lands,
but that was under an extremely particular set of facts involving state law
enforcement capability. 533 U.S. 353 (U.S. 2001).
196
Montana, at 566.
195

288

section.197 The first question for a jurisdictional analysis, then, is
what type of property are rights-of-way through tribal lands: do they
remain standard trust land, or do they constitute fee land? The
answer seems to be somewhere in between.
Under traditional property law principles, rights-of-way are
conventionally viewed as non-possessory interests—”easements
that do not convey fee title and may be limited to a specific use or
purpose.”198 Thus, under a traditional interpretation, a tribe would
have regulatory jurisdiction over a right-of-way as it would over any
other reservation or trust land. But in the world of federal Indian
law, traditional interpretations have morphed into complex and
confusing arrangements. In a handful of opinions, federal courts
have concluded that right-of-way easements are “equivalent” to
non-Indian fee land for purposes of tribal jurisdiction. These
opinions continue a multi-decade trend of the judiciary to erode
tribal jurisdiction, but ultimately should not categorically foreclose
regulation here, for reasons explained below.
The leading case in this line is Strate v. A-1 Contractors,
which dealt with a state highway right-of-way and a tribe's authority
to adjudicate a tort claim over an accident that occurred on that
highway.199 The Court concluded that although the right-of-way
passed over tribal trust land, the land within the right-of-way was
“equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to such alienated,
non-Indian land.”200 To reach this conclusion, the Court considered
several factors: “the legislation creating the right-of-way; whether
the right-of-way was acquired with the consent of the tribe; whether
197

Given that significant portions of land in many reservations has been
transferred to nonmembers in fee through various allotment-style actions, it is
possible that a pipeline or railroad could pass through a reservation but remain
entirely within fee land without a right-of-way. In this scenario, the Montana
analysis discussed infra would still apply. It is also worth noting that regulation
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the tribe had reserved the right to exercise dominion and control over
the right-of-way; whether the land was open to the public; and
whether the right-of-way was under state control.”201 Although this
case dealt with adjudicative, rather than regulatory, jurisdiction, the
Court stated that “a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed
its legislative jurisdiction.”202
Despite this overarching precedent, the Department of the
Interior, under the Obama administration, took the position that no
categorical rule exists on the question of whether a right-of-way
easement is equivalent to non-Indian fee land; rather, a fact specific
inquiry is necessary using the Strate factors.203 As made apparent by
several cases discussed below, this is also the position that the Ninth
Circuit has implicitly taken. That court has never concluded
absolutely that a right-of-way is non-Indian fee land without first
considering the facts, even if the court ultimately determined that
tribal jurisdiction is lacking. Because the context can vary
dramatically with respect to the Strate factors, a fact specific inquiry
is the correct analysis.
If pipeline or railroad rights-of-way are determined to be
conventional trust land for jurisdictional purposes, as distinguished
from the highway right of way in Strate, then tribes have the
underlying authority to regulate activity over that right-of-way, and
the basic jurisdictional inquiry ends there. If, on the other hand,
fossil fuel easements are equivalent to non-Indian fee land for
jurisdictional purposes (applying the Strate test), the “Montana
Test” will apply.204 Under Montana, inherent sovereign jurisdiction
over nonmembers on nonmember fee land is prohibited unless one
of two exceptions are met.205 First, tribes may exercise jurisdiction
201
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would apply here. The question would be whether the statute that transferred
property interests away from the tribe, IRWA, abrogated the tribe's treaty-based
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that case did not raise treaty arguments. Strate instead dealt with a landowner's
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over the activities of nonmembers who “enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases or other arrangements.”206 Second, tribes
may assert jurisdiction over “the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe.”207 A line of cases in the Ninth Circuit applies
the Montana Test to determine tribal jurisdiction over rights-of-way
in Indian Country.208 These cases do not involve fossil fuel
easements, but examination of the judicial analyses does provide
some important insight to how a court might characterize
jurisdiction over such a right-of-way.
In State of Montana Department of Transportation v. King,
the court prohibited the assertion of a tribal employment preference
ordinance against a state conducting maintenance on a state highway
right-of-way through a tribe's reservation.209 The court applied the
Strate factors and concluded that the highway was equivalent to
non-Indian fee land, thus triggering the Montana test.210 Applying
the test, the court rejected the consensual relationship exception,
stating that “transfers of property interests between governmental
entities create property rights; they generally do not create

right to exclude. Moreover, South Dakota v. Bourland, a case very similar to
Montana, says that the effect on the land at issue is dispositive. 508 U.S. 679,
692 (1993). In Bourland, the Court concluded that because the land was opened
to the public, the tribe lost its right to “absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation.” Id. at 697. Arguably, IRWA did not have this effect. Instead, it
only grants a usufructuary interest to a nonmember. In addition, tribal consent
was always required. Therefore, a tribe under the Treaty of Point Elliot may still
retain its right to exclusive use, despite some property interests being transferred
away from the tribe. This treaty-based approach opens up an entirely new and
distinct analysis. We save that full discussion of a treaty-based right to regulate
for another article, although several subsequent footnotes in this article will
address the question. Moreover, there is a very strong argument that the tribal
regulation via inherent regulatory authority, under the second Montana Test
exception, applies per se (see infra discussion).
206
Montana, at 565.
207
Montana, at 565.
208
See also Big Horn County Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 950
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a tribal lacked jurisdiction to tax the property of a
telecommunications company when that property sat atop a right-of-way granted
to the company).
209
Montana Dept. of Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999)
[hereinafter King].
210
Id. at 1113.
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continuing consensual relationships.”211 The court went on to
conclude that the health and welfare exception was not satisfied
either.212 Although the tribe's interest in mitigating the harm caused
by unemployment on the reservation might have been legitimate,
this was not the type of harm to health and welfare contemplated by
Montana.213
Drawing on this precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Burlington
North Railroad Company v. Red Wolf rejected tribal adjudicative
jurisdiction over a tort claim by tribal members against a railroad for
an accident occurring on the railroad's right-of-way through trust
lands.214 Using the Strate factors, the court concluded (as it did in
King) that the right-of-way was equivalent to non-Indian fee land
and that application of the Montana Test was appropriate.215 The
tribal members argued that because tribal consent is required before
a right-of-way through a reservation may be granted, a consensual
relationship is created between the grantee and the tribe.216 The
court rejected this argument, citing King for the principle that “A
right-of-way created by Congressional grant is a transfer of a
property interest that does not create a continuing consensual
relationship between a tribe and the grantee.”217 The court also
rejected application of the second exception, noting that the threat
to health and welfare must be “demonstrably serious” and that
railcar accidents, even those with the “possibility of injuring
multiple tribal members” do not meet that standard.218
Unlike the cases discussed above, where jurisdiction was
asserted over relatively benign activity, the potential for accidents
during fossil fuel transport does indeed pose a grave threat to tribal
health and natural resources. Thus, if a court were to apply the
211
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Montana Test to a tribe's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over
fossil fuel right-of-way easements, then the “health and welfare”
exception appears satisfied, as even a cursory examination of fossil
fuel transport accidents shows that the potential harm posed by some
of these projects is “demonstrably serious,” meeting the standard
announced in Red Wolf.
As an example of the grave harm posed by oil “bomb trains”
carrying Bakken crude oil, a derailment in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec
killed fifty people and destroyed or contaminated nearly every
building in the downtown area.219 Fire response personnel testified
in later hearings before the U.S. Congress that people were
“vaporized” upon exiting their homes.220 The derailed train dumped
26,000 gallons of crude oil into the Chaudière River.221 In the Pacific
Northwest, the 2106 derailment at Mosier, Oregon along the
Columbia River Gorge necessitated a clean-up with short-term costs
of nearly $9 million. 222 In periods of low precipitation, explosions
carry the added potential of sparking a wildfire capable of
eradicating entire communities of the sort that incinerated Paradise,
California, in a matter of hours in November 2018.223 Oil train
219
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explosions and the resulting contamination pose threats to tribal
members’ health and welfare that fall into in a different league than
the car accidents considered by the courts in Strate and Red Wolf.
Safety records point to grave threats from pipelines as well.
In 2016, 633 pipeline leaks and explosions occurred in the United
States; on average, a pipeline incident occurred almost twice a day
during that year.224 These accidents caused sixteen deaths, eightyseven injuries, and well over $321 million in clean-up costs.225 Such
data suggests that pipeline ruptures and explosions are common, and
sometimes catastrophic. Fossil fuel contamination, whether from oil
train derailments or pipeline ruptures, can ruin reservation water
supplies, expose tribal members to acute short-term and long-term
health effects, and damage tribal fisheries and wildlife. 226 A
multitude of experiences, studies, and data build a case towards
making a categorical determination that fossil fuel transport meets
the health and welfare exception of Montana, thereby justifying
tribal jurisdiction over these activities across reservations. Indeed,
the federal government and court decisions have already recognized
that the health and welfare exception of Montana may be met when
a tribe's water resources are threatened.227
The second, consensual relations, exception of Montana
triggers a different analysis, one turning on variable circumstances
involving the precise right-of-way, so it is not susceptible to a
presumptive (or categorical) application. The most recent Ninth
Circuit precedent stems from the Red Wolf decision, which held that
no consensual relationship was formed by a right-of-way grant. But
224
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in so finding, Red Wolf seemingly misplaced its reliance on King.
King involved a tribal-state dispute over right-of-way jurisdiction,
and that court clearly stated that “transfers of property interests
between a tribal governmental entities create property rights; they
generally do not create continuing consensual relationships”
(emphasis added).228 While the King context involved a tribal-state
transfer, the fossil fuel context involves a property relationship
between a government and a private entity, such as a railroad or
pipeline developer. This indeed may create a consensual
relationship that is absent in the government-to-government
transfer. While the Red Wolf court collapsed the two contexts into
one test, it seemingly did so without analysis, and a future court
would be justified in revisiting the question and distinguishing the
private fossil fuel context from the King facts.
But even more notable, these cases (King and Red Wolf)
were both decided prior to the enactment of the new right-of-way
regulations. As discussed in the previous section, the new
regulations clearly form a continuing relationship between the
grantee and the tribe, because they require tribal consent at multiple
points in the lifetime of the grant rather than only at the initial
application stage. They also provide tribes with significant
negotiating power to set conditions and restrictions when that
consent requirement is triggered. Within this new regulatory regime,
it seems paradoxical to condition continued activity on affirmative
tribal consent yet deny that a continuing consensual relationship
exists.229 But, in any event, the argument for satisfying the “health
and welfare” exception of Montana is strong enough (as explained
above) that tribes should not have to premise their regulatory
authority on the consensual relationship exception.
To summarize, tribes should retain inherent regulatory
jurisdiction over fossil fuel rights-of-way, despite the multi-layer
jurisdictional analysis required to arrive at that conclusion. If the
right-of-way is found to be trust land, the tribe retains its sovereign
authority unfettered by narrowing court opinions. If the right-of-way
228

King, at 1113.
In addition, the Department of Interior recently took the position that
consensual relationships between right-of-way grantees and tribes are, at the
very least, not categorically foreclosed moving forward Brief for Dept. of the
Interior, Western Energy Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior,
2016, at 30.
229
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is found to be the equivalent of non-Indian fee land, thus triggering
the Montana test, the tribe seemingly retains its sovereign authority
to regulate because one, if not both, of the exceptions can be
satisfied.230
2.  

Federal Preemption Issues

If tribes retain authority to regulate, the second issue is
whether that authority is preempted by federal law.231 Federal
statutory regulation of these fossil fuel projects is sweeping and
expressly preempts most state and local laws. Several of the relevant
federal laws, however, fail to make any reference to tribal regulation
or tribes generally, and there may be a sound argument that they do
not even apply to tribes in some circumstances.232 But even if they
do apply, no express conflict exists under the plain language in two
of the three relevant statutes.
This article does not analyze in depth whether each
applicable federal law preempts tribal regulation; such analysis
draws a complex inquiry and warrants a dedicated commentary of

230

Moreover, IRWA regulations seem to concede initial tribal jurisdiction,
though they limit such jurisdiction by preemption concepts, discussed in the next
section. Under the regulations for rights-of-way, easements are subject to tribal
law except to the extent that tribal law is inconsistent with federal law. In other
words, tribes can regulate except to the extent that federal law preempts the
exercise of tribal law. 25 C.F.R. § 169.6. Kevin Washburn impliedly
characterized this provision as a “Strate fix,” preserving tribal jurisdiction over
easements moving forward. Washburn & Cummings, supra note 119, at 17-9.
231
Again, the terms of each particular grant will likely control. For example, a
grant might expressly and absolutely waive tribal jurisdiction over the easement.
The analysis here presumes that a grant is silent as to jurisdiction and regulatory
authority.
232
With some exceptions, courts have generally adhered to the principle that
Congressional intent to divest a tribe of sovereign authority should be clear and
express. Furthermore, the Indian Canons of Construction, which say that “any
doubtful expressions of legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the
Indians” should operate in this context. A statute of general applicability will
apply to tribes unless one of the following exceptions are met: 1) application
would impede purely intramural tribal government processes, 2) the application
would infringe on treaty rights, or 3) Congressional intent to exclude tribes is
demonstrated. See Donovan v. Coeur D'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th
Cir. 1985). Arguably, applying these statutes, particularly to the extent that
concurrent tribal regulation is precluded, would infringe on the treaty right to
exclude, as tribes would not be able to exclude export projects from their
reservations.

296

its own.233 The following discussion instead maps the terrain
generally and examines the statutory language for express reference
to tribes and their laws. Because the statutes governing pipelines and
those governing railroads are distinct, this section handles them
separately. Subsection (a) examines preemption under the Pipeline
Safety Act (PSA), which controls pipeline safety standards.
Subsection (b) considers the preemption provisions of the ICCTA,
which governs coal-by-rail and oil-by-rail, and the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), which governs oil-by-rail
only.
a.  

Federal Pipeline Regulation

Pipeline construction and safety is regulated by a myriad of
federal and state statutes and regulations.234 State law cannot
preempt tribal law, so the preemption analysis only involves federal
law.235 Further, because the right-of-way regulations require consent
for new easements (as previously explained), any new pipeline
construction could conceivably be denied on consent grounds
without the need for tribal regulation.236 Any regulation from a tribe
would instead likely be over existing infrastructure through safety
requirements, such as design, emergency plans and procedures,
operation, and maintenance of pipeline facilities.
The closest federal parallel to such regulation appears to be
the PSA.237 The PSA’s stated purpose is to “provide adequate
protection against risks to life and property posed by pipeline
233

Aside from the complexity of the statutory analysis involved, the policy
justifications for preemption differ enormously between contexts. It matters
greatly whether federal preemption operates as a tool to drive destruction of
local ecological and human communities, or whether it provides a bar against
the same. Conceivably, cases could arise out of federal environmental protection
rules imposed on tribal-led projects, approved by a tribal council, that threaten
irrevocable damage to reservation lands and resources that are held in trust to
perpetually sustain future generations of tribal members. That is not the case
addressed in this article, where tribal councils oppose numerous fossil fuel
projects that have high potential for damage but are nevertheless streamlined by
federal law. It is sufficient here to note that the federal Indian trust responsibility
imposes a duty of protection that frames any preemption issue.
234
“Pipeline Transportation of Natural Gas and Crude Oil: Federal and State
Regulatory Authority”: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44432.pdf.
235
See Cohen, supra note 177.
236
25 C.F.R. § 169.107(a).
237
49 U.S.C.A. § 60101 - 60141.
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transportation and pipeline facilities.”238 To that end, the statute
grants the Secretary of Transportation the power to promulgate and
enforce minimum pipeline and facility safety standards.239
While expressing preempting state standards, the PSA is
altogether silent as to tribal regulation.240 The omission suggests that
tribal governments have retained regulatory authority over pipeline
safety within their borders. The PSA stands in marked contrast to
the HMTA, discussed infra, where both tribal and state regulation is
expressly limited by the same preemption provision. Since Congress
enacted the PSA four years after amending the HMTA to preempt
tribes, it would seem that Congress intentionally omitted tribes from
the PSA preemption provision.241 There appears to be no mention of
tribes within the legislative history, much less a discussion of the
implications on tribal regulation. In sum, there are no clear signs of
preemption or express conflict in the PSA. The lack of preemption
or conflict suggests that, through tribal regulatory law, tribes may
create and enforce pipeline safety standards more stringent than
federal standards.242
b.  
i.  

Federal Rail Regulation

Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA)
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49 U.S.C.A. § 60102.
49 U.S.C.A. § 60101-60141.
240
49 U.S.C.A. § 60104(c).
241
See FN 251 infra. The PSA was enacted in 1994 to combine and recodify the
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (formerly 49 U.S.C.A. 20012014) (HLPSA) and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (formerly 49
U.S.C.A. 1671). See Sutton, Randy J., Validity, Construction, and Application of
Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 60101 et seq., and Other Acts Subsumed
Therein, 186 A.L.R. FED. 361 (2003).
242
Importantly, a safety standard that temporarily shuts down flow may, in the
context of natural gas, implicate the Natural Gas Act (NGA, 15 U.S.C. § 717f)
and involve the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Like the PSA,
the NGA is also silent on tribal regulation. However, courts have held that “once
natural gas is “dedicated” to interstate commerce under a certificate of public
convenience and necessity, that gas may not be withdrawn from the interstate
market without prior [FERC] approval,” even when a tribe is electing to
withdraw the gas on tribal lands. However, the case involved a taxation dispute,
not an attempt by a tribe to regulate for environmental protection purposes. See
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 578 F.2d 289,
291 (10th Cir. 1978).
239
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The ICCTA provides the Surface Transportation Board
(STB) with general federal oversight of railway operations.243 The
aim of the ICCTA is to improve the consistency and efficiency of
interstate rail traffic by centralizing authority within this agency.244
The ICCTA controls general rail transportation, meaning that both
coal trains and oil trains fall within the STB’s regulatory scheme.
The ICCTA grants the STB exclusive authority over two general
matters: 1) Transportation by rail carriers, and remedies with respect
to rates, routes, and services; and 2) Construction of tracks and
facilities.245
Preemption language in the statute’s section 10501(b) makes
clear that the “remedies provided” under the ICCTA are “exclusive
and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law.”246
Ordinances from states and local governments that seek to regulate
rail traffic are commonly invalidated under this “exclusive”
authority provision.247 Courts have held that state and local law may
not impose “operating limitations,” such as limits on train length,
speed, or scheduling, on rail carriers.248 Further, state and local laws
compelling rail carriers to undergo “substantial capital
improvements” are preempted.249
Although the explicit ICCTA preemption language has been
construed to bar state and local regulation, courts have not evaluated
243

“Regulation - Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
Preemption,” 65 Am. Jur. 2d Railroads § 184 (2018).
244
Id.
245
49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(b).
246
Id. Interpreting this provision, one court stated, “It is difficult to imagine a
broader statement of Congress's intent to preempt state regulatory authority over
railroad operations.” See City of Auburn v. U.S. Government, 154 F.3d 1025,
1030 (9th. Cir. 1998) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
944 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1996)).
247
City of Auburn, at 1033; see also, Association of American Railroads v.
South Coast Air Quality Management District, 622 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.
2010); Green Mountain Railroad Corporation v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 640
(2nd Cir. 2005). However, courts have noted that state laws which have a
“remote or incidental” effect on rail transportation are permissible. The question
is to what degree the state law burdens rail transportation. Furthermore, the STB
has ruled that the preemption provision does not extinguish the right of state and
local actors to “impose appropriate public health and safety regulation on
interstate railroads,” as long as regulation does not interfere with or
unreasonably burden rail transportation. Tovah R.Trimming, “Derailing Powder
River Basin Coal Exports: Legal Mechanisms to Regulate Fugitive Coal Dust
from Rail Transportation,” 6 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 321 (2013).
248
See supra Section IV.B.2-3.
249
Id.
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tribal regulation through the provision. The statutory language of
section (b) expressly preempts only “Federal and State” laws.250
Tribes are referenced in subsection (c) which notes that state, local,
and tribal authority over certain public transportation and solid
waste shipment by rail is unaffected by the statute.251 One might
argue that tribal authority over these matters would not need to be
preserved if the statute did not otherwise apply to preempt tribal
regulation. However, the explicit mention of tribal authority in
section (c) also shows that Congress was aware of the potential for
tribal regulation, and suggests that the omission of tribes from (b)
must be purposeful, particularly given the placement of (b) and (c)
quite literally next to each other in the statute.
Similar to the PSA analysis above, the ICCTA can and
should be viewed in comparison to the HMTA. The ICCTA was
enacted after tribes were added to the HMTA.252 Despite the
HMTA's five-year-old express preemption against tribal regulation
of certain rail traffic, Congress did not expressly preempt tribal
regulation of rail traffic more broadly in the ICCTA. Accordingly,
tribal regulation of coal and oil trains should not be hindered by the
ICCTA's preemption provision directed to states.253 However, as
noted previously, federal oversight of oil trains falls under the
HMTA as well, which has a preemption provision that bars tribal
laws. The next subsection discusses that provision along with a
potential work-around through a preemption waiver.
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49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(b).
49 U.S.C.A. § 10501(c).
252
See FN 251, infra. Moreover, the ICCTA was enacted around fifty years after
IRWA, meaning that railroad rights-of-way through Indian Country were
commonplace at the time of enactment.
253
The Federal Rail Safety Act (FRSA) (49 U.S.C.A. § 20106), which governs
rail safety requirements, also potentially preempts state rail safety rules.
However, as with the PSA and the ICCTA, FRSA's preemption provision does
not mention tribes. Furthermore, the regulations implementing the HMTA
regulations covering preemption also reference FRSA as another potential
source of preemption. However, those regulations clearly refer only to the
preemptive nature of the HMTA in regard to tribal regulation, while referring to
both the HMTA and FRSA as potentially preempting state regulation. 49 C.F.R.
§ 174.2, 49 C.F.R. § 179.8.
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ii.  

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA)

The HMTA regulates shipment of hazardous materials,
including oil-by-rail, declaring its purpose to “protect against the
risks to life, property, and the environment that are inherent in the
transportation of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and
foreign commerce.”254 The HMTA gives the Secretary of
Transportation authority over the “safe transportation, including
security, of hazardous materials” in commerce.255
In contrast to the PSA and the ICCTA, the HMTA does
abrogate tribal regulatory power over oil trains, expressly
contemplating tribal regulation.256 The statute contains an express
preemption provision, declaring that “unless authorized by another
law,” a tribal “requirement” is preempted if one of two conditions is
met:257 1) if compliance with the tribe's requirement and “a
requirement of this chapter, a regulation prescribed under this
chapter, or a hazardous materials transportation security regulation
or directive issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security” would
not be possible;258 of 2), if the tribal requirement “is an obstacle to
accomplishing and carrying out” the HMTA, a regulation of the
HMTA, or any other hazardous materials transportation requirement
from the Secretary of Homeland Security.259
The provision has generated some caselaw. In Northern
States Power Company v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Community, a tribal law that regulated the transport of nuclear
254

The HMTA does not apply to pipelines, 49 U.S.C.A. 5126(b)(1) and does not
appear to cover coal-by-rail. 49 U.S.C.A. § 5126(b)(1). Although the statute and
regulations do not explicitly say so, coal train regulations are generally under
ICCTA, rather than HMTA, preemption. See Holmquist v. U.S., 2017 WL
3013259 (E. D. Wash. 2017); see also Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Goldthwaite,
176 So.3d 1209 (Ala. 2015). Thus, any preemptive effect of the HMTA for
tribal oil train regulation should not apply for tribal coal train regulation. Comes
down to whether it meets one of the 9 hazard classes activated charcoal.
255
49 U.S.C. § 5103(b).
256
49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a), 49 C.F.R. § 171.1, 49 C.F.R. § 174.2, 49 C.F.R. §
179.8. Tribes were not listed in the HMTA’s preemption provision until 1990.
See PL 93–633 (HR 15223) (1975). HMTA that did not include tribes in
preemption provision 49 USC 1811; but see PL 101–615 (1990) (HMTA that
included tribes in preemption provision 49 USC 1811); PL 101 (HR 3229), from
Sept. 7, 1989, was the first proposed version of amended HMTA with “tribes” to
appear in history.
257
49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a).
258
49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a)(1).
259
49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(a)(2).
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material through a reservation was held to be preempted by the
HMTA.260 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the tribal ordinance's
extensive information requirements would demand too much of
transporters and frustrate shipping that was allowed under the
HMTA.261 The court concluded that the tribal law created an
obstacle to the goals of the HMTA and was therefore preempted by
that statute.262
A court following on Prairie Island would likely hold that a
tribal ordinance regulating oil trains (rather than nuclear waste
trains) is likewise prohibited. Yet one possible, largely untested,
workaround exists in the statute’s waiver application. A provision
of the HMTA allows for a tribe to apply to the Secretary of
Transportation to waive federal preemption of a tribal ordinance.263
As a requirement of the waiver application, the tribe must concede
that its law is preempted by the HMTA.264 The Secretary may then
grant the waiver if two conditions are met: 1) that the tribal
ordinance “provides the public at least as much protection” as the
HMTA and its regulations; and 2) that the ordinance is not an
unreasonable burden on commerce.
The first prong is easily satisfied by a tribal regulatory
ordinance restricting rail transport of oil via “bomb trains” currently
allowed by federal law. The second prong, on the other hand, makes
for a more difficult argument against preemption, as “unreasonable
burden” on commerce is not defined. The only guidance comes from
the relevant regulations, which prescribe several factors to govern
the inquiry:
260

In 1991, the Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Community passed an
ordinance that required shipping companies to obtain a tribal permit one
hundred and eighty days prior to transporting nuclear material through their
reservation. The ordinance gave the tribe power to deny permits and impose a
substantial fine for willful violations. Northern States Power Company sought
declaratory judgment that ordinance was preempted by the HMTA. The court
concluded that the tribal ordinance's 180-day license and notice requirements
create a much stricter standard than that which HMTA requires, creating an
obstacle to the HMTA's goals. The tribal ordinance was ruled to be preempted.
The holding suggests that a similar regulatory ordinance that acts upon fossil
fuels rather than nuclear material would also be preempted. See Northern States
Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d
458 (8th Cir.1993) [hereinafter Prairie Island].
261
Id. at 462.
262
Id.
263
49 U.S.C.A. § 5125(e).
264
Id.
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1. The “extent to which increased costs and impairment of
efficiency” result from the tribe's requirement;
2. Whether the tribe's requirement has a rational basis;
3. Whether the tribe's requirement achieves its stated
purpose; and
4. Whether there is a “need for uniformity with regard to the
subject concerned,” and if so whether the tribe's requirement
“competes or conflicts” with those of other States, municipalities,
or tribes. 265
A well-crafted ordinance, complemented by accident impact
data that demonstrates necessity, should easily secure the second
and third factors as weighing in favor of the tribe. The efficiency
factor and the uniformity factors, on the other hand, will likely
weigh against a restrictive tribal ordinance. The PHMSA, the
agency charged with authority over hazardous materials, has
indicated that the need for efficiency and uniformity prevent tribal
“opt out” from transport routing decisions,266 and the agency may
cite this “need” to deny a waiver application. However, the
discretion involved in a waiver determination also conjures federal
trust and treaty obligations, which must permeate the agency’s
consideration of these factors. Acting in the tribe’s best interest may
well mean waiving preemption for a tribal regulation designed to
protect tribal resources, particularly if those regulations promote the
statute’s
stated
protectionary
purpose.
Judicial guidance on the likelihood of waiver application
success is almost nonexistent, as there is only one published case in
which a state or local government applied for a waiver of
preemption, and tribes apparently never have.267 Regardless, if the
Secretary refused the tribal waiver, then the tribe may be positioned
to bring suit for a breach of the trust obligation (described in Section
IV.A). While the waiver cannot be viewed as a guaranteed avenue
around preemption, the process itself may provide a platform for
judicial interpretation of the trust responsibility.
iii.  

The Dormant Commerce Clause
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49 C.F.R.§ 107.221.
Final Rule on Oil Trains, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, at 293.
267
New York v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 700 F.Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(where state of New York applied for a waiver of preemption).
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Apart from statutory preemption, the Dormant Commerce
Clause raises an inquiry. It comes into play when state laws impede
interstate commerce, so the question is whether it operates in a
similar way for tribes. The answer should be no, as the Dormant
Commerce Clause was not designed to limit tribes. The doctrine
derives from the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and addresses the federalism relationship between
states and the federal government. Courts crafted this doctrine to
prevent states from passing overly-protectionist economic laws that
frustrate interstate commerce, thus interfering with the overall
federal commerce schemes.268 The Interstate Commerce Clause,
which provides the source of the doctrine, expressly references
states and not tribes.269 An entirely separate clause, the Indian
Commerce Clause, forms the source of Congressional power over
tribes.270 As separate sovereigns (albeit “domestic dependent
nations”), tribes should arguably be free to promote or restrain
economic ventures regardless of how those actions affect the states.
Notably, the Supreme Court has refused to equate states and tribes
for purposes of the Interstate Commerce Clause in challenges to
tribal tax regiments,271though the Court has not addressed the tribal
regulatory measures.hbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjhbjh.
In the event a court applied the Dormant Commerce Clause
to tribes, the analysis still allows substantial opportunity for tribes
to regulate. The courts have deemed permissible under the Dormant
Commerce Clause state regulations that are not inherently
protectionist and that merely cause an “incidental burden” on
268

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (U.S. 1978).
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 191 (U.S. 1989).
270
See Cohen, supra note 177.
271
See Cotton Petroleum Corp., at 192 (“It is also well established that the
Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have very different
applications. In particular, while the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned
with maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence of
implementing federal legislation…the central function of the Indian Commerce
Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs…”); see also, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache, 455 U.S. 130, 154
(U.S. 1982). Examining a tribal tax regiment under Commerce Clause scrutiny,
the Court prefaced that examination by noting “even if we assume that tribal
action” is subject to the Commerce Clause. Id. Thus, although not an explicit
answer, such a qualification by the Court implies would that it did not believe
that such scrutiny was necessary, on the grounds that the Commerce Clause does
not limit tribal action.
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commerce.272 The Supreme Court articulated the general test as
follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.273
Increasingly, as local non-tribal governments seek to
regulate “bomb trains” through their jurisdictions as well as other
fossil fuel infrastructure, the Dormant Commerce Clause will gain
attention. In depth analysis of this area is beyond the scope of this
article, but a few observations are in order. First, well-crafted tribal
regulations would not be geared toward “economic protectionism”
but rather would be aimed at safeguarding health and resources,
deemed a “legitimate local public interest,” and any burden on
commerce would amount to an “incidental”– not primarily intended,
though clearly significant—effect of such protection. Second,
although regulations would likely burden interstate commerce, that
burden would arguably not be “clearly excessive” against the threat
posed to tribal life, property, and natural resources. Finally,
considering that the passage of these trains and pipelines through
tribal lands creates an inherent and fairly unavoidable risk of
disaster, there is seemingly no viable alternative to protect these
interests that would lessen the impact on commerce.
In sum, while the Dormant Commerce Clause clearly
applies to states, the reasoning behind the doctrine and language
from Supreme Court caselaw weigh against its application to tribes.
But even if a court were to conclude that the doctrine applied to
tribes, regulations designed to limit fossil fuel transport through
reservations may be justified under the prevailing Supreme Court
test. Admittedly the Dormant Commerce Clause is relevant, but it
remains difficult to predict the outcome of any application in the
fossil fuel context
272

National Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F3d 1144, 1148
(9th Cir. 2012).
273
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (US 1970) (emphasis added).
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C.   Conclusion: On-Reservation Prerogatives
In sum, tribes retain a great deal of power over fossil fuel
projects that pierce directly through tribal lands, despite a judicial
trend over the past century to constrain the power of tribes over their
reservations. In the property law framework, tribes retain significant
power over easements as specified in the IRWA: they can refuse to
consent to new grants, refuse to consent to renewal of existing
grants, and enforce the terms of existing grants against grantees that
attempt to quietly violate those terms. In the regulatory framework,
tribes retain at least some direct authority over these projects.
Regulation of pipeline safety and coal trains seems unhampered by
preemption concerns. Regulation of oil trains may face difficult
preemption-style barriers, though leverage may be found within the
largely untested waiver of preemption found in the HMTA.
The tools discussed in this section are available against onreservation projects only. Unfortunately, on-reservation action will
not always be sufficient. Many of these fossil fuel projects skirt
around reservations so that their physical footprints never actually
cross tribal land, yet their disastrous impacts threaten to cross
jurisdictional boundaries or damage treaty resources outside those
boundaries. Off-reservation projects require a different approach
described in the next section, one that makes demands and asserts
unique tribal rights within the matrix of federal, state, and local
processes.
IV.   OFF-RESERVATION TRIBAL PREROGATIVES
Much as tribes’ ecological interests and environmental
ethics transcend modern political borders, so do tribal legal
prerogatives reach beyond reservation boundaries.274 To halt fossil
fuel infrastructure off-reservation, tribes must apply their legal
levers within the permit systems of federal, state, and local
jurisdictions. Two types of tribal rights are particularly relevant to
these efforts in the Pacific Northwest. First, the federal Indian trust
responsibility affirmatively imparts a fiduciary duty on all branches
274

See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, “Looking to the Third Sovereign: Tribal
Environmental Ethics as an Alternative Paradigm,” 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
397 (2016).
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and agencies of the federal government, as trustees, to protect the
interests of federally recognized tribes, as beneficiaries.275 The trust
responsibility is triggered any time a federal action or decision
implicates tribal interests.
Second, treaty-guaranteed “usual and accustomed” fishing
rights ensure tribes’ sovereign entitlements to fishing access,
harvest, and habitat protection in and around traditional tribal
fishing waters.276 Pacific Northwest tribal treaty fishing rights have
been robustly interpreted by the federal judiciary, in effect reserving
a considerable management role in shared resources to the region’s
original sovereigns.277
This Section begins by examining the role of the federal trust
responsibility in the context of fossil fuel transport and export
projects, then turns to tribal treaty fishing rights as they operate to
constrain hazardous off-reservation fossil fuel infrastructure.
Throughout, this Section examines case studies of tribes
successfully asserting core sovereign legal prerogatives to halt the
transport of fossil fuels across their ancestral lands and waters.
A.   The Federal Indian Trust Responsibility in the Century of
Climate Change
For nearly 200 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently articulated a trusteeship between the federal
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See U.S. v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 n. 3 (2003)
(recognizing the general trust relationship between tribes and the United States
as one of “a ward to his guardian” (quoting Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
1, 17 (1831)).
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See Washington v. Wash. St. Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n., 443
U.S. 658, 674-79 (1979) (“At the treaty council the United States negotiators
promised, and the Indians understood, that the Yakimas would forever be able to
continue the same off-reservation food gathering and fishing practices as to
time, place, method, species and extent as they had or were exercising. The
Yakimas relied on these promises and they formed a material and basic part of
the treaty and of the Indians’ understanding of the meaning of the treaty.”
(quoting U.S. v. Washington, 384 F.Supp 312, 381 (W.D. Wash. 1974))
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)) (harvest); U.S. v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (access); U.S. v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 852-53 (9th
Cir. 2016) (habitat).
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For background and commentary on recent cases, see Michael C. Blumm,
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and the Environment: Affirming the Right to
Habitat Protection and Restoration, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2017).
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government and all federally recognized tribes.278 As the Court
proclaimed in Dept. of Int. & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath
Water Users Protective Assn.:
The fiduciary relationship has been described as ‘one of the
primary cornerstones of Indian law,’ and has been compared
to one existing under a common law trust, with the United
States as trustee, the Indian tribes or individuals as
beneficiaries, and the property and natural resources
managed by the United States as the trust corpus.279
Though the history of federal Indian relations is marked
more by a breach of the trust obligation than its fulfillment, 280
nevertheless the principle remains an important and enduring legal
obligation towards tribes. As first articulated by Justice John
Marshall in the 1830s, a core fiduciary duty of the federal trustee is
to protect sovereign tribal nations and Native American persons as
beneficiaries.281 In 1886, the Court stated that this “duty of
protection . . . . has always been recognized by the executive, and by
congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.”282 In
1924, the Court found that, in regard to tribal interests, the United
States is “bound by every moral and equitable consideration to
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See Dept. of Int. & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users
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FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (Rennard Strickland
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Interior, Dec. 10, 2013:
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/commission/upload/Rep
ort-of-the-Commission-on-Indian-Trust-Administration-andReform_FINAL_Approved-12-10-2013.pdf.
281
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1832). In characterizing the nature of the trust responsibility, Justice
Marshall made clear that the affirmative trust obligation of the federal
government toward tribes in no way diminishes tribes’ inherent sovereignty.
“This relation [is] that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful.” Worcester, at 555; “Protection does not imply the destruction
of the protected.” Id. at 518.
282
U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
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discharge its trust with good faith and fairness.”283 The Indian trust
responsibility obligates the federal government to protect tribal
lands and off-reservation resources on ceded lands284 whether that
cession was accomplished by treaty, statute, or executive order.285
The federal government’s “overriding duty” to tribal nations
and people is ongoing,286 as the modern Supreme Court
acknowledges “the undisputed existence of a general trust
relationship between the United States and the Indian people.”287 An
earlier landmark case, Seminole Nation v. U.S, provides the
enduring benchmark of the federal trust responsibility and is still
cited today by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) as defining its
fiduciary obligations:288
Under a humane and self-imposed policy which found
expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions
of this Court, [the federal government] has charged itself
with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust.
Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it
in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by
the most exacting fiduciary standards.289
The trust responsibility is germane to virtually every
proposed fossil fuel transport project, whether on- or offreservation, because federal decision-making is likely to be involved
at one or more stages of permitting, construction, and development.
The federal fiduciary duty of protection towards tribes is incumbent
283

U.S. v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924) (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119
U.S. 1, 298 (1886)).
284
See, e.g., Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he
tribes’ federally reserved fishing rights are accompanied by a corresponding
duty on the part of the government to preserve those rights.”); Muckleshoot v.
Hall, 698 F.Supp. 1504, 1510-11 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (finding tribal fisheries are
property rights protected by federal trust responsibilities).
285
Parravano, 70 F.3d at 545 (“We have long held that when it comes to
protecting tribal rights against non-federal interests, it makes no difference
whether those rights derive from treaty, statute or executive order, unless
Congress has provided otherwise.”).
286
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 236 (1974).
287
U.S. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
288
“Frequently Asked Questions—What is the Federal Indian Trust
Responsibility?” Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Interior:
https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions.
289
Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942) (emphasis added).
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on federal agents every time a proposed fossil fuel project directly
or indirectly implicates tribal property, including shared waters and
fisheries to which tribes retain harvest rights.290 291 While the BIA is
specially charged with administering Indian trust lands and services
for Native American tribes and individuals, the trust responsibility
extends to all branches, agencies, and agents of the federal
government. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized, “This trust
responsibility extends not just to the Interior Department, but
attaches to the federal government as a whole,”292 and “any Federal
government action is subject to the United States’ fiduciary
responsibilities toward the Indian tribes.”293 As such, the trust
remains a key potential legal lever for tribes opposing permit
decisions (before a multitude of varied federal agencies) for fossil
fuel projects that threaten tribal fishing or hunting rights or water
rights off their reservations.
1.  

The Modern Trust: A Muddled Context

In its most fundamental form, the trust responsibility toward
tribes creates a duty of protection—imposing the “most exacting
fiduciary standards”—towards tribal lands, waters, treaty rights, and
other tribal resources.294 As straightforward as that seems,
enforcement of the trust responsibility is quite complex due to a line
of cases decided over the past three decades reflecting basic

290

See Muckleshoot v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1510-11 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(finding tribal fisheries are property rights protected by federal trust
responsibilities); Robert T. Anderson, “Indian Water Rights and the Federal
Trust Responsibility.” Natural Resources Journal, vol. 46, no. 2, 2006, pp. 399–
437.
291
See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d at 546 (“This trust responsibility extends
not just to the Interior Department, but attaches to the federal government as a
whole.”); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d
1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (hereinafter Pyramid Lake); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d
701, 711 (9th Cir. 981); N.W. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 931
F.Supp. 1515, 1519 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (“This [trust] obligation has been
interpreted to impose a fiduciary duty owed in conducting ‘any Federal
government action’ which relates to Indian tribes.” (quoting Nance, 645 at F.2d
at 711)).
292
Parravano, 70 F.3d at 546.
293
Nance, 645 F.2d at 711.
294
Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297.

310

confusion between the two contexts in which the trust responsibility
is enforced against agencies.295
One such context involves tribes seeking injunctive relief
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in federal district
court.296 This context for federal trust responsibility is important
because injunctive relief aims to stop damage before it happens.
Tribes will likely seek injunctive relief when challenging federal
agency decisions regarding fossil fuel transport and export projects.
Trust claims for injunctive relief are most often brought under the
(APA), which allows courts to set aside an action that is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law.”297 Early cases arising in this context rendered
decidedly favorable decisions towards tribes. One of the clearest
declarations of the administrative trust responsibility in this context
was made in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, a case involving
the Secretary of the Interior’s water allocations from a river, to the
detriment of tribal fisheries.298 The Court stated:
The Secretary was obligated to formulate a closely
developed regulation that would preserve water for the
Tribe. He was further obliged to assert his regulatory and
contractual authority to the fullest extent possible to
accomplish this result . . . The Secretary’s action . . . fails to
demonstrate an adequate recognition of his fiduciary duty to
the Tribe. This is also an abuse of discretion and not in
accordance with the law.299

295

See Warner, supra note 8, at 20-28. See also Mary Christina Wood, The
Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and Resources through
Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355
(2003). Parts of this discussion are adapted from that article. For a textbook
treatment of this area of Indian law, see LAITOS, ZELLMER, AND WOOD,
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 2D 394-397 (West 2012).
296
See supra note 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
297
5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A). For cases that have incorporated trust analysis within
statutory claims brought under the APA, see Northwest Sea Farms v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engrs.,931 F.Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996); Quechan Tribe of the
Fort Yuma Reservation v. Dept. of Interior, 755 F.Supp.2d 1104 (2010); Gros
Ventre Tribe v. U.S., 469 F.3d. 801 (9th Cir. 2006); Pit River Tribe v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006).
298
354 F.Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
299
Id. at 256-57 (emphasis added).
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Several other cases decided after Pyramid Lake also invoked the
trust obligation to protect Indian lands and resources against harm
by federal agencies acting either through the federal government’s
permitting role or its public land management role.300
The second, and notably distinct, context of trust
enforcement involves tribes seeking monetary damages against the
BIA for mismanaging their lands, a line of challenge not so pertinent
to the off-reservation context. Those suits are brought in the Court
of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act301 or the Indian Tucker
Act.302 The language of those statutes is far more restrictive than the
APA because both of the Tucker Acts require express law
supporting claims for damages against the United States.303 The
Indian Tucker Act requires claims be based on express law found in
the Constitution, statutes, executive orders, or treaties.304 The
Tucker Act requires that claims be based on the Constitution, a
statute, regulation, or contract.305 The Supreme Court has stressed
300

See, e.g., Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep. 3065 (D.
Mont. 1985) (mem.) (finding violation of trust responsibility by Dept. of Interior
in issuing coal leases on public lands adjacent to Cheyenne Reservation);
Klamath Tribes v. U.S. Forest Service, 1996 WL 924509 (D. Or. 1996)
(enjoining timber sales that could adversely affect treaty hunted deer herds,
finding that the Forest Service has a “Substantive duty to protect ‘to the fullest
extent possible’ the tribes’ treaty rights, and the resources on which those rights
depend.”); Northwest Sea Farms, 931 F.Supp. at 1520 (“In carrying out its
fiduciary duty, it is [the federal agencies’] responsibility to ensure that the
Indian treaty rights are given full effect.”).
301
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
302
28 U.S.C. § 1505.
303
See Warner, supra note 8, at 20-28. The Tucker Act allows individuals to
pursue monetary claims against the federal government. This act extends to
claims by allottees on Indian reservations. The Indian Tucker Act allows tribes
to sue the federal government for damages. See United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 211-12 (1983) (hereinafter Mitchell II).
304
The Indian Tucker Act provides:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the
United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe,
band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within
the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever such claim
is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which would
otherwise be cognizable in the Court of Claims if the claimant were not
an Indian tribe, band or group. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added)
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphasis added).
305
The Tucker Act provides in pertinent part:
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or an Act of Congress or any regulation of an
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that the express source of law supporting either Tucker Act claim
must “fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damages sustained.”306 Several major
Supreme Court cases dealing with the federal trust obligation arise
out of this damages context, where tribes have challenged BIA’s
mismanagement of their lands or resources such as timber or
minerals. 307
Trust enforcement under the APA is much broader than
under the Tucker Acts because under the APA there is no
requirement of premising a claim on a statute or some other source
of express law.308 Due to the two statutory contexts, courts should
treat trust issues arising under the Tucker Acts and the APA
separately to develop two distinct prongs of the overall trust
doctrine. But recent decisions have ignored the different contexts in
which trust claims are brought, applying Tucker Act restrictions to
claims brought under the APA.309 These holdings require a tribe to
premise its APA trust claims on a statute or other source of express
law.310 This approach is erroneous because the APA does not have
the restrictive language found in the Tucker Acts.
The judicial error confusing the two prongs of trust
enforcement traces back through the case law to a 1980 case decided
by the D.C. Circuit, North Slope Borough v. Andrus.311 In that case
the Inupiat people of Alaska sued the Secretary of the Interior,
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1983) (emphasis added).
306
Mitchell II, supra note 299, at 216-17 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 400 (1976)); United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 123 S.
Ct. 1126, 1132 (2003) (hereinafter White Mountain Apache Tribe). The Supreme
Court has also indicated that the federal government's “elaborate control” over
tribal property may support a claim under both Tucker Acts. See Mitchell II, at
209, 225; White Mountain Apache, at 1133. This control theory, however, is
generally not applicable where the government is taking action off the
reservation, thereby incidentally affecting, rather than directly controlling, tribal
property.
307
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) (hereinafter Mitchell I);;
Mitchell II; White Mountain Apache Tribe; United States v. Navajo Nation, 123
S.Ct. 1079 (2003).
308
See Warner, supra note 8, at 28-29; see also APA, 5 U.S.C. 706 (granting
general authority to courts to set aside agency action “not in accordance with
law.”).
309
See Warner, supra note 8, at 30-31.
310
Id.
311
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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asserting that the Secretary’s program of federal oil leasing in the
Beaufort Sea would threaten the bowhead whale population the
Inupiat people hunted, and therefore would violate the Secretary's
trust responsibility toward them to protect their harvest rights. This
was a suit seeking injunctive relief under the APA.312 In language
that launched the present confusion, the court applied United States
v. Mitchell (a Tucker Act case known as Mitchell I because it was
the first of two Supreme Court decisions in the same case) and held:
[A] trust responsibility can only arise from a statute, treaty,
or executive order; in this respect we are governed by the
recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mitchell
holding that the United States bore no fiduciary
responsibility to Native Americans under a statute which
contained no specific provision in the terms of the statute. . .
. We have no specific provision for a federal trust
responsibility in any of the statutes argued to us. . . . by
confining the extension of trust responsibility, however
defined and whatever the source, to the area of overlap with
the environmental statutes, the district court was arguably
consistent with the Supreme Court's rationale in United
States v. Mitchell. Without an unambiguous provision by
Congress that clearly outlines a federal trust responsibility,
courts must appreciate that whatever fiduciary obligation
otherwise exists, it is a limited one only.313
This judicial misstep remains rather astonishing, because it amounts
to applying the strict requirements of one statute (the Tucker Act) to
a case premised on an entirely different statute (the APA) lacking
such restrictive language.314 The Mitchell I holding (upon which the
North Slope court relied) was unambiguously tied to the express
language in the Tucker Act.315 Unfortunately, once a mistake takes
312

Id. at 592.
Id. at 611-12 (citing district court opinion).
314
For further discussion, see Warner, supra note 8, at 30-31; Wood, Trust II,
supra note 1, at 117-21.
315
See Mitchell I, at 546, emphasizing:
The individual claimants in this action premised jurisdiction in the
Court of Claims upon the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, which gives that
court jurisdiction of 'any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress.' . . . . The General
313
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hold in one case, it becomes stare decisis that judges rely upon in
deciding future cases and can thereby metastasize through an entire
body of caselaw. The misapplication of the trust doctrine originating
in North Slope v. Andrus found its way into Ninth Circuit law,
blurring the critical distinction between the two prongs of trust
enforcement. In a 1998 case, the Morongo Band of Mission Indians
brought a claim under the APA against the Federal Aviation
Administration for situating a flight path into Los Angeles
International Airport directly over canyons on the reservation where
tribal members conducted traditional ceremonies.316 The court
applied United States v. Mitchell (a case arising under the Tucker
Act) and concluded: “[U]nless there is a specific duty that has been
placed on the government with respect to Indians, [the trust]
responsibility is discharged by the agency's compliance with general
regulations and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting
tribes.”317 This flawed line of precedent led some courts, including
the Ninth Circuit, to collapse the Indian trust responsibility with
federal laws and regulations of general application.318
Allotment Act . . . cannot be read as establishing that the United States
has a fiduciary responsibility for management of allotted forest lands.
Any right of the respondents to recover money damages for
Government mismanagement of timber resources must be found in
some source other than that Act.
See also Mitchell II, at 217-18:
[I]n United States v. Mitchell [I]. . . this Court concluded that the
General Allotment Act does not confer a right to recover money
damages against the United States. . . . [W]e held that the Act creates
only a limited trust relationship. The trust language of the Act does not
impose any fiduciary management duties or render the United States
answerable for breach thereof. . . . Thus, for claims against the United
States 'founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department,” 28 U.S.C. 1491, a court
must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly be
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for
the damages sustained. . . . The question in this case is . . . whether the
statutes or regulations at issue can be interpreted as requiring
compensation.
316
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration, 161
F2d. 569 (9th Cir. 1998) (hereinafter Morongo Band).
317
Id. at 574; see also Skokomish Indian Tribe v. F.E.R.C., 121 F3d 1303 (9th
Cir. 1997) (rejecting argument that FERC “must afford an (sic) tribes greater
rights than they would otherwise have under the [Federal Power Act] and its
implementing regulations.”).
318
See Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 479 (9th Cir.
2000) (“Federal agencies owe a fiduciary responsibility to Native American
tribes. In the absence of a specific duty, this responsibility is discharged by ‘the
agency's compliance with general regulations and statutes not specifically aimed
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The requirement of filing suit under a specific statutory duty
operates as a barrier for tribes seeking to protect their lands and
natural resources because there are few environmental or natural
resources statutes that impose specific duties toward tribes. Such an
interpretation of the trust obligation is inaccurate and may severely
limit its benefit to tribes. Fortunately, tribes’ equitable challenges to
off-reservation fossil fuel infrastructure now create fresh
opportunities for the courts to reflect on the meaning and scope of
the federal Indian trust responsibility. One such case involved the
Nez Perce Tribe successfully challenging large fossil fuel extraction
equipment passing through its ceded territory, as described in
Section 2 below.
2.  

Enforcing the Trust Through the APA:
Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service

In 2013, the District of Idaho held that Indian trust
responsibility required the United States Forest Service to exercise
its statutory authority to protect tribal property rights that were being
directly threatened by fossil fuel infrastructure.319 This “megaloads” case involved shipments of massive evaporators, used in tar
sands oil extraction, across the Rocky Mountains and into Canada,
through traditional Nez Perce territory and National Forest lands on
at protecting Indian tribes.’”) (citing Morongo Band, supra note 312)(other
citations omitted); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir.
2000); Gros Ventre Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, CV 00-69-MDWM (Order) at 6-7 ((D. Mon. Jan. 29, 2001) (“The United States' trust
obligations are content-less unless a statute, regulation, or treaty supplies the
imperatives.”). But see Island Mountain Protectors, et. al., 144 IBLA 168, at
184-85 (May 29, 1998) noting:
In addition to a mandate found in a specific provision of a treaty,
agreement, executive order, or statute, any action by the Government is
subject to a general trust responsibility (citing Mitchell II) . . . . BLM
had a trust responsibility to consider and protect Tribal resources. 'A
federal agency's trust obligation to a tribe extends to actions it takes off
a reservation which uniquely impact tribal members or property on a
reservation.' While the trust responsibility created by environmental
laws may be 'congruent' with other duties they impose, the enactment
of those laws does not diminish the Department's original trust
responsibility or cause it to disappear. BLM was required to consult
with the Tribes and to identify, protect, and conserve trust resources,
trust assets, and Tribal health and safety in making its [decision
approving expansion of mine].” (Other citations omitted).
319
Nez Perce Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2013 WL 5212317 (D. Idaho 2013)
[hereinafter Nez Perce].
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U.S. Highway 12.320 The Forest Plan governing the National Forest
at issue directed the Forest Service to “[e]nsure that Forest actions
are not detrimental to the protection and preservation of Indian
Tribes’ religious and cultural sites and practices and treaty
rights.”321 According to the court,
The Forest Service has a statutory duty, under the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA),322 to act consistently with
this Forest Plan direction. Overarching [the Forest Service’s]
statutory duty, is the Government’s duty as trustee over the
Tribe. The Supreme Court has held that the ‘constitutionally
recognized status of Indians justifies special treatment on
their behalf when rationally related to the Government’s
unique obligation toward the Indians.’323
The Nez Perce Tribe prevailed in leveraging the trust
responsibility to obtain a preliminary injunction ordering the Forest
Service to close Highway 12 to the mega-loads.324 The Court held
that “the mega-loads at least had the potential to be ‘detrimental’”
to the tribal rights and interests protected by the Forest Plan, which
“triggered a duty on the part of the Forest Service to consult with
the Tribe.”325 Moreover, the Court expressly and correctly
characterized its exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the trust
responsibility as purely equitable: “The plaintiffs are not seeking
damages; they are seeking to preserve their Treaty rights along with
cultural and intrinsic values that have no price tag.”326
While the District of Idaho’s opinion failed to elaborate
extensively on the Indian trust responsibility, its ruling underscores
the equitable powers of the court in this context and puts all federal
agencies on notice that they must fulfill their trust obligations to
tribes when taking action carrying the “potential to be ‘detrimental’”
320

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 5, quoting Forest Plan for the Clearwater National Forest:
https://www.fs.usda.gov/detail/nezperceclearwater/landmanagement/planning/?c
id=stelprdb5404075. The Nez Perce Tribe reserved treaty rights to hunt and fish
within the present-day National Forest. Id.
322
16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)(i).
323
Id. at 5-6 (citing Washington v. Wash. Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Assoc., 443 U.S. 658, 673 n. 20 (1979)) (emphasis added).
324
Id. at 8.
325
Nez Perce, at 6 (emphasis added).
326
Id. at *7.
321
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to tribal interests. The opinion marks an important return to earlier
caselaw enforcing the trust obligation through equitable relief in the
APA context. As a practical matter, tribal challenges to modern
fossil fuel projects will likely invoke both statutory and trust
grounds. The Nez Perce court recognized the agency’s statutory
authority to halt the mega-loads and imposed the trust obligation on
the agency to use such authority to protect tribal interests.327 This
approach very much parallels that taken in the Pyramid Lake case
discussed above where the court required the Secretary of Interior
to “assert his regulatory and contractual authority to the fullest extent
possible” to preserve water for the tribe.328
In sum, fossil fuel transport and export projects that propose
to cross off-reservation ceded territories may seriously impinge on
tribal interests, including property rights. Tribes continue to press
federal agents to fulfill their duties under the federal Indian trust
responsibility and deny permits for mega-loads, bomb trains, and
other hazardous fossil fuel infrastructure. When that trust obligation
is not upheld, courts may exercise their equitable jurisdiction to
enjoin federal agency action.329 Though this trust responsibility has
received erratic and inconsistent interpretation and enforcement
against environmental threats (over the past few decades in
particular), it remains a reservoir of legal obligation that can be
invoked by Pacific Northwest tribes to stop fossil fuel export
permits,330 as with the notable success of the Nez Perce Tribe. In
327

The case implicitly left an open question what the result would have been if
the Forest Plan had lacked protective language towards tribes. Because the trust
obligation originated long before any statutory scheme and stands apart from
statutes, federal managers are obligated by that trust to protect tribal interests
even if their prior planning processes fail to articulate the duty.
328
See Pyramid Lake, 354 F.Supp. at 256-57 (emphasis added) (demonstrating
that where a federal agent has authority over matters implicating tribal interests,
the agencies have a duty to uphold the trust responsibility by prioritizing tribal
rights to the maximum extent possible within the bounds of their discretion); see
Mary Christina Wood, “Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty:
The Trust Doctrine Revisited,” 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1529 n.275.
329
See Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 INDIAN L. RPTR. 3065, 3071, 3074
(D. Mont. 1985); Pyramid Lake, at 256.
330
The trust responsibility was also used as a basis by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to deny a permit for a coal export facility at Cherry Point,
Washington. See discussion infra Section IV.B.1.a. For an amicus brief setting
forth the federal Indian trust responsibility in a case supporting a motion for
summary judgement by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe seeking to enjoin
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline, see https://www.indianaffairs.org/uploads/8/7/3/8/87380358/amici_brief_supporting_srst_smj.pdf.
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addition to this trust responsibility, some tribes also have enduring
treaty rights that provide a powerful source of protection against
federal and state agency permitting actions as described in the next
section.
B.  

Tribal Treaty Fishing Rights Asserted Against
Fossil Fuel Projects

Treaty-reserved fishing rights are tribes’ most potent tool for
stopping off-reservation fossil fuel infrastructure in the Pacific
Northwest. Through nineteenth-century treaties with the United
States, tribes reserved “usual and accustomed” (U&A) fishing rights
to most rivers, streams, and marine waters across the region.331 As
the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “the Indians were vitally
interested in protecting their right to take fish at all usual and
accustomed places, whether on or off the reservations. . . .”332
Today, tribes continue to exercise considerable influence over
activities that impact off-reservation treaty waterways and fisheries.
The transport of oil, gas, coal, and other fossil fuel derivatives within
or along treaty fishing waters may directly imperil tribal fishing
either by interfering with access or by damaging fish habitat through
spills and pollution.333 In response, tribes are drawing upon their
treaty-reserved fishing rights to successfully block fossil fuel
infrastructure projects in ancestral territories beyond modern
reservation boundaries.
Treaty rights represent the first, original, and antecedent
property rights in the Pacific Northwest. Since time immemorial,
tribes have possessed what modern legal systems recognize as
property rights, over vast ancestral territories. Through extensive
jurisprudence, courts have enumerated the dimensions of aboriginal
rights legally retained by tribes.334
331

U&A tribal treaty fishing rights operate distinctively on the Columbia River,
which tribes have managed as a shared fishery since time immemorial and
regard as “The Great Table.” Today, the entirety of Columbia River Zone 6
constitutes a U&A fishing site. This 147-mile stretch of the Columbia River
between Bonneville and McNary dams is an exclusive tribal treaty commercial
fishing area. See “Columbia River Zone 6,” Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish
Commission: http://www.critfc.org/about-us/columbia-river-zone-6/.
332
Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667.
333
See supra Section II.B.
334
See generally Michael Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal
Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern
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Notably, treaties did not create or give rights to tribes, but
rather memorialized the inherent property rights that tribes reserved
from their land cessions to the United States.335 In this way, treaty
rights represent unbroken threads of continuity between tribes and
the landscapes, waterways, and biotic communities that tribes have
stewarded for millennia. The U.S. Constitution honors the
antecedent nature of tribes’ sovereign property rights, declaring
treaties to be “the supreme law of the land.”336 The treaties
negotiated between tribal nations and the United States supersede
all local and state laws, as well as most federal laws.337
The treaty fishing rights reserved across the Pacific
Northwest have turned out to be among the strongest and most
expansive in the nation. Between 1854 and 1856, many tribes
throughout the Puget Sound, Pacific Coast, and Columbia River
Basin regions entered into treaties negotiated by Isaac Stevens, the
first governor of what was then the Washington Territory. All of
these so-called “Stevens treaties” include the following clause,
expressly reserving tribal fishing rights: “The right of taking fish at
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to
said Indians in common with all other citizens of the Territory . . .
.”338 These treaty fishing rights are commonly referred to as “usual
and accustomed,” or “U&A” fishing rights.
Courts have held that U&A tribal fishing rights accord
Pacific Northwest tribes important corollary rights. First, tribal
Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, Aboriginal Policy Research
Consortium International (2004):
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1241&context=aprci.
335
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (explaining, “the treaty was not a grant of rights to
the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not
granted”).
336
Art. VI, cl. 2, U.S. Constitution.
337
Under the plenary power doctrine, Congress has the authority to enact laws
which limit or take away, i.e. abrogate, treaty-reserved tribal rights. See Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved
unless Congress evinces a clear and unambiguous intent to abrogate. See
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (noting the intention
to abrogate treaty rights is “not to be lightly imputed to Congress,” quoting
Pigeon River, etc., Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)); U.S.
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (emphasizing, “Indian treaty rights are too
fundamental to be easily cast aside”).
338
See, e.g., Treaty with the Duwamish, Suquamish, etc., 1855, 12 Stat. 927,
ratified Mar. 8, 1859, proclaimed Apr. 11, 1859:
http://www.washington.edu/diversity/files/2013/03/treaty-point-elliott.pdf.
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treaty fishing rights include the right of access to all usual and
accustomed fishing sites, including through and within private
property.339 Second, tribal treaty fishing rights include the right to
take up to half of the harvestable portion of a particular fishery,340
and in 2016, Pacific Northwest tribes won a landmark victory
securing a third right when the Ninth Circuit upheld a ruling that
tribes’ “right of taking fish” included a corollary right: the right of
habitat protection.341 The case described below is known as the
“Culverts case.”
Culverts Treaty Rights Victory
The Culverts case began in 2001, when a coalition of twentyone tribes across Washington State filed a claim against the State
regarding “barrier culverts.”342 Barrier culverts are large pipes
beneath roadways allowing streams to flow but obstructing the
migration of anadromous fish.343 Anadromous fish include salmon
and trout species that spawn (lay eggs) in freshwater streams,
migrate out to the sea as juveniles, then return upstream as adults to
spawn.344 Barrier culverts restrict access to spawning habitat,
ultimately reducing the number of adult fish available for catch.345
The tribes alleged that the State had unlawfully abrogated treaty
fishing rights by cutting off spawning habitat through installing and
maintaining these non-fish passable culverts.346 The tribes sought
declaratory and injunctive relief mandating that the State remove
and replace over 1,000 barrier culverts.347 Taken together, the
identified culverts blocked fish migration on approximately 1,000
339

Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (holding that U&A tribal treaty rights “imposed a
servitude upon every piece of land” that tribal peoples had traditionally used to
access fishing waters; also characterized as “easements,” id. at 384.).
340
U.S. v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974, aff’d, 443 U.S. 658
(1979)); see also Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 US at 686 (the court imposed a
“moderate living standard” as a ceiling to the harvest amount tribes were entitled
to).
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U.S. v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter “Culverts”]
(amended in part by U.S. v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirmed
by an equally divided court, Washington v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 1832 (2018).
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linear miles of streams and 5 million square meters of habitat:
enough to produce an additional 200,000 adult salmon each year.348
The district court for the Western District of Washington,
and subsequently the Ninth Circuit, ruled in favor of the tribes.349
The District Court found the tribes had relied on the treaties to
secure a continuing supply of fish when they ceded vast lands to the
federal government containing U&A fishing sites.350 The barrier
culverts violated the expectations memorialized by those treaties.
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling and held that, by building and maintaining barrier culverts,
Washington State “has violated, and continues to violate, its
obligation to the Tribes under the fishing clause of the Treaties.”351
The court found the State had breached its treaty duty to the tribes
despite the Court’s finding that “this consequence was not the
State’s ‘primary purpose or objective.’”352 Because diminishing the
supply of fish available to tribal fishers was an incidental impact,
rather than the primary purpose, of the State’s barrier culverts, “[t]he
‘measure of the State’s obligation therefore depends ‘on all the facts
presented’ in the ‘particular dispute.’”353 The case was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court, resulting in a 4-4 split vote of the
Justices, thus affirming (without an opinion) the Ninth Circuit
decision.354
The same fact-based standard applied to the culverts context
seemingly applies to proposed fossil fuel transport projects because
oil and gas pipelines, coal and oil trains, and export terminals
similarly impact tribal treaty fishing rights in an incidental rather
348
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U.S. v. Washington, 20 F.Supp.3d 828 (W.D. Wash. 2007); U.S. v.
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than directly intentional manner.355 Professor Michael Blumm offers
a useful analysis of the legal standard set forth in the Culverts case,
noting “Applying treaty rights to particular activities will be a
factual decision” involving a two-step test: 356 (1) there must be “an
affirmative action adversely affecting fish subject to the treaties,”
and (2) such action “must proximately cause significant damage.”357
Accordingly, courts will most likely assess and adjudicate threats to
tribal treaty fishing rights and fisheries on a case-by-case basis.358
The Culverts decision clarifies the affirmative duty of both
state and federal agencies to carefully consider potential impacts on
fish habitat as well as other U&A tribal treaty fishing rights.359 As
Blumm explains, “The Ninth Circuit’s decision . . . make[s] clear
that regulatory agencies cannot approve developments that block
access to treaty fishing sites or diminish the availability of
harvestable fish.”360 In effect, the Ninth Circuit has embraced a test
that places the onus on lawmakers and resource managers at every
level of government to uphold tribal treaty rights of access, harvest,
and habitat, bound by duties flowing from tribes’ treaty-guaranteed
fishing rights.361 As Professor Blumm describes, “all non-tribal
entities should now feel prodded to improve salmon habitat-harming
processes of their activities.”362 The following Subsections explore
tribal strategies to leverage treaty fishing rights in order to defeat
proposed fossil fuel transport projects at every jurisdictional level.
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Curtailing tribal fishing is probably never the “primary purpose” of fossil fuel
infrastructure projects.
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Michael C. Blumm, Indian Treaty Fishing Rights and the Environment:
Affirming the Right to Habitat Protection and Restoration, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1,
31 (2017).
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Id. at 31-32; see also Robert T. Anderson, “Federal Treaty and Trust
Obligation, and Ocean Acidification,” 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 474
(2016).
358
Blumm, supra note 352, at 32.
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1.  

Federal: The De Minimis Impacts Test

As explained at the outset of this article, federal agencies are
frequently involved in facilitating, reviewing, and permitting
proposed fossil fuel transport and export projects.363 On reservation,
the BIA plays an important role approving or disapproving third
party applications seeking rights-of-way across tribal reservation
land.364 Off reservation, the array of federal actors multiplies (due
to the several environmental permitting requirements triggered
when a project threatens to damage air and water resources), and any
number of agencies may exercise permitting authority (or similar
approval) over areas within a tribe’s U&A territory. Federal
agencies that may exercise jurisdiction over proposed fossil fuel
infrastructure impacting treaty fishing rights include: the Army
Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of
Energy and the Bonneville Power Administration (within DOE), the
Department of Transportation and the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (within DOT), the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(Department of Commerce), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(Department of Interior), the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Coast Guard, and the State Department.365 Insofar as tribes hold
U&A treaty fishing rights in portions of rivers and streams that pass
through federal public lands, federal land management agencies
such as the United States Forest Service, the Park Service or Bureau
of Land Management may also be involved.366 All federal agencies
are legally bound to protect and uphold tribal treaty rights as the
“supreme law of the land.”367
The Army Corps of Engineers is one of the federal agencies
tribes are most likely to confront at the interface of tribal treaty
fishing rights and proposed fossil fuel infrastructure projects.368 The
Army Corps has jurisdictional authority over all construction, fill,
or excavation in “navigable waters” of the United States.369 By
definition and precedent, navigable waters includes all non-enclosed
363

See supra Section II.D.
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365
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33 U.S.C. § 403.
364

324

marine waters and fresh water bodies capable of being navigated for
purposes of interstate commerce as well as wetlands associated with
navigable waters.370 The geographic scope of Army Corps authority
is thus largely coextensive with major tribal U&A treaty fishing
territories, including the Puget Sound and the greater Salish Sea, as
well as the Columbia River and its tributaries.371 The Army Corps
is an important gatekeeper in permitting any port facility, and
typically serves as the lead agency in the NEPA process for any
project slated to be constructed in, on, or overlying, navigable
waters. For example, The Army Corps was the primary federal
agency exercising regulatory authority over the proposed Gateway
Pacific Terminal at Cherry Point, which the Corps denied in 2016
based on the Lummi Nation’s successful assertion of U&A treaty
fishing rights, discussed below.372
Lummi Nation Protects Cherry Point
The Lummi Nation’s Cherry Point victory is probably the
most significant and widely known example to date of a tribally led,
treaty rights-based defeat of a proposed fossil fuel export project in
the Pacific Northwest. Located on Rosario Strait outside the city of
Bellingham, Washington, Cherry Point lies within the Lummi
Nation’s adjudicated U&A fishing grounds, reserved by the tribe in
the 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott.373 The proposed Gateway Pacific
Terminal (GPT) slated to be constructed at Cherry Point would have
been the largest coal export facility in North America,374 designed
to process up to 48 million metric tons of coal annually for export to
Asian markets.375 The Lummi Nation formally filed opposition to
370
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See Memorandum for Record from Michelle Walker, Chief, Regulatory
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construction of the GPT in January 2015 by submitting a request to
the Army Corps’ Seattle District to deny the GPT’s Section 404
permit application.376 Through declaratory evidence and technical
fish catch data, the tribe was able to satisfactorily demonstrate to the
Army Corps that the Cherry Point area is an important tribal fishing
site that is “productive and regularly fished.”377 As a result, the
Army Corps found that the GPT “would have a greater than de
minimis impact on the Lummi Nation’s access to its usual and
accustomed fishing grounds,” and it denied the permit.378
The de minimis impacts standard is an important precept for
tribes and tribal attorneys to grasp and argue when attempting to
stop a proposed or existing fossil fuel transport or export project.
The de minimis standard is fundamentally rooted in the important
Indian law tenet and canon of construction that tribal treaty rights
may not be abrogated without express authorization by Congress.379
Courts and federal agencies use the de minimis standard to assess
whether an infringement on tribal treaty fishing rights rises to the
level of being “legally significant,” i.e. de facto abrogation, and
therefore meritorious of judicial intervention.380 As the Army Corps
explained in its decision denying the GPT, “If the impact on either
[the right of access or the right to take fish] is greater than de
minimis, in other words the impact is legally significant, the Corps
would be required to deny the permit because only Congress can
abrogate a treaty right.”381
The Lummi Nation carried its burden by building a strong
evidentiary foundation for the Corps’ “greater than de minimis”
determination. To begin with, the Nation provided fourteen tribal
declarations demonstrating exercise of treaty fishing rights by tribal
http://www.alternet.org/environment/how-indigenous-tribes-are-fighting-fossilfuel-industry-and-winning. At full operational capacity, GPT would have
handled 487 total annual vessel calls, an average of 1.3 cargo ships traveling
through of Lummi U&A treaty fishing territory every day. See Memorandum of
Record at 10.
376
Memorandum of Record, at 1.
377
Id. at 26.
378
Id. at 31.
379
See FN 312 (Lonewolf v. Hitchcock), supra; see also Passenger Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have
been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights”).
380
Memorandum for Record, at 1; see also Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, 931 F.Supp. 1515, 1520-22 (W.D. Wash. 1996)
(applying the de minimis test to the Lummi’s right to access for fishing).
381
Memorandum of Record, at 20.
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members in the Cherry Point area.382 These declarations included
maps showing where tribal members fished, specifically, “all the
maps show fishing or crabbing within or near the footprint of the
GPT.”383 The Lummi Fisheries Harvest Manager also provided a
declaration supported by nearly 40 years of data demonstrating that
tribal fishing at Cherry Point and within the GPT footprint had
“resulted in millions of fish and shellfish catches by Lummi
fishermen.”384 In addition, the Tribe submitted an independently
prepared Vessel Traffic and Risk Assessment Study,385 which
demonstrated that Lummi fishers “spend at least 1/3 of their time in
the Cherry Point subarea.”386 The Study concluded that, at full
operation, the GPT footprint and associated marine vessel traffic
would disrupt the Lummi fishing in the Cherry Point subarea by 76
percent.387 Altogether, the Corps found the body of evidence
assembled and presented by the Lummi Nation “substantial”388 and
“sufficient to support a finding that the construction of GPT would
have greater than a de minimis impact on Lummi U&A treaty fishing
rights.”389 As a result, the Corps was obligated to deny the Section
404 permit for GPT.390
Tribes seeking to stop fossil fuel export or transport projects
within U&A treaty fishing territories are well-advised to look to the
Lummi Nation’s successful strategy.391 In particular, tribes may
wish to collect declarations from tribal members or gather
commission studies regarding the tribal exercise of treaty fishing
rights and anticipated project impacts and submit this record to
federal regulatory authorities responsible for granting or denying
permits for projects in treaty fishing waters.392 However,
382
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circumstances vary tremendously, and some tribes may encounter
more difficulty demonstrating clear conflict between a given fossil
fuel project and tribal U&A treaty fishing rights. As Professor
Robert T. Anderson has observed, “The Cherry Point decision rested
on evidence of direct interference with Lummi fishing by increased
shipping traffic (at the terminal). The less direct the connection
between such interference and environmental harm, the more
difficult the case will be.”393
Still, the Lummi Nation’s landmark victory at Cherry Point
provides a valuable template of how one tribe successfully defeated
a fossil fuel infrastructure project by proving to a federal decision
maker the greater than de minimis impact on U&A treaty fishing
rights that would result.394 As the Federal District Court of
Washington made clear in a case decided over 20 years earlier
concerning the same treaty fishing area, “In carrying out its
fiduciary duty, it is the government’s, and subsequently the Corps’,
responsibility to ensure that Indian treaty rights are given full
effect.”395 The court’s statement makes clear that the federal trust
obligation (explained in Section IV.A.) reinforces treaty rights as
well. Reflecting this duality, the Army Corps expressly noted in its
Memorandum of Record regarding the GPT and Lummi treaty
fishing rights, “the Corps [has a] fiduciary duty to take treaty rights
into consideration when making its permit decisions.”396 The next
section explains the application of treaty rights to states and local
entities in more detail.
2.  

States: Protecting Tribal Resources Through General Public
Benefits Standards

393

See Schwartz, supra note 15.
At a 2017 presentation on the Cherry Point victory, Lummi tribal attorney
Mary M. Neil emphasized the important role of the Tribe’s coordinated public
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While states have historically demonstrated tense
relationships with tribes397 and outright hostility to tribal treaty
fishing rights,398 Pacific Northwest states in particular have begun
to signal legal regard for tribal authority and treaty fishing rights
when tribal interests conflict with proposed fossil fuel infrastructure.
Both expressly and implicitly, state agencies in Oregon and
Washington have denied permits for fossil fuel transport projects
based in part on prospective impacts to tribal treaty fishing rights.
State agencies appear to be recognizing that tribes’ treatyguaranteed rights to fisheries in fact promote public benefits of
ecosystem protection and align naturally with states’ broader
environmental policy mandates.399 By denying permits for fossil
fuel infrastructure projects that endanger tribal treaty fishing rights,
states are taking steps to fulfill what the Ninth Circuit has referred
to as “the State’s precise obligations and duties under the
treat[ies].”400 The discussion below elaborates upon key examples
to provide guidance to tribes in navigating state permitting processes
triggered by fossil fuel project proposals.
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a.  

Coyote Island Terminal Defeat

When a fossil fuel export facility involves construction along
navigable waters, the permitting process typically requires approval
from one or more state agencies (in addition to federal approvals).
This type of requirement became center stage in a controversy over
the proposed Coyote Island Terminal in Oregon in 2014. The
company financing Coyote Island Terminal had sought a removalfill permit from the Department of State Lands for construction of
an industrial loading dock on the Columbia River, at the Port of
Morrow in Boardman, OR, approximately 270 miles upstream from
the mouth of the Columbia.401 Coyote Island was designed to serve
as a transfer station for 8.8 million tons of coal per year, which
would be transported by rail to the Port of Morrow, loaded onto
barges at Coyote Island, then shipped downriver, where the coal
would be transferred onto oceangoing cargo ships bound for Asia.402
On August 18, 2014, the Oregon Department of State Lands
denied a permit for the proposed coal transport facility on the
Columbia River.403 The matter was then appealed to the Office of
Administrative Hearing. On August 11, 2016, after an extensive
review, the administrative law judge issued a ruling upholding the
Department of State Land’s earlier order rejecting the permit.404
Four Columbia River tribes with U&A treaty fishing rights
in and along the Columbia——the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Reservation, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs
Reservation, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama
Nation, and the Nez Perce Tribe405—as well as their inter-tribal
401
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fishery agency, the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
(CRITFC)—played a key advocacy role in challenging the permit.
During the initial comment period for the permit application, and in
response to a subsequent investigation by the Department of State
Lands, the four tribes and CRITFC submitted information and
affidavits showing that “negative impacts would occur to tribal
fishing and fisheries from: fill size and location physically
interfering with fishing; operation of the dock facility causing noise,
light, vibration, and increased barge interference.”406 The
Department described the tribal information as “extensive, robust,
and persuasive input,” and cited numerous affidavits, reports,
photos, and declarations.407 The submitted evidence included
“historical information, descriptions, mapping, photographs, and a
video,” the totality of which, in the Department’s words, “support
that there is commercial, subsistence and cultural fishing uses by
tribal fishers of Waters of the State in the project area.”408 At the
later procedural stage in the administrative process, the four tribes
were granted authority to participate as “limited parties” and
submitted an extensive response to the proponent’s Motion for
Summary Determination.409
The written opinions of both the Department of State Lands
and the Administrative Law Judge reflect the significance of tribal
fishing interests in the permit denial. The regulatory decisionmaking context was set by ORS 196.825, a state law which governs
permit issuance. A permit may only issue if the Department
determines that the project 1) “is consistent with the protection,
conservation and best use of the water resources of this state,” and
2) would not unreasonably interfere with the paramount policy of
this state to preserve the use of its waters for navigation, fishing and
public recreation.”410 The Department is required to examine several
listed factors in making these determinations.
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In evaluating the list of factors, the Department’s order
referenced evidence of tribal fishing use on multiple occasions.
Tribal fishing interests made a prominent appearance in the
Department’s evaluation of the first factor, (3)(a), which focuses on
the “public need for the proposed fill” and the public benefits likely
to result from the fill. The opinion listed evidence submitted by both
the project proponents (arguing public need for the facility) and the
opponents, which included the tribes describing their distinct fishing
interests. The Department concluded that low public need did not
justify the fill, and that evidence regarding social and economic
benefits (presumably of the natural area without the fill) was
“inconclusive, with the notable exception of the fisheries.” Since the
only evidence on fisheries that appeared in the written decision
pertained to tribal fisheries, it may be assumed that the subsequent
finding pertained to those tribal fisheries: “Regarding fisheries. . .
the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that there is a small
but important long-standing fishery at the project site, which is itself
a social, economic and other benefit to the public. The fishery is
more significant than the public benefits that may be derived from
the proposed fill.”411 The conclusion is dramatic in many ways, as it
represents the outcome of a balancing test between conflicting
public economic and environmental needs. By weaving the tribal
fishery interests into “public need,” the Department opened an
avenue for tribal interests through the express language of the statute
(language likely replicated in other state statutes as well).
Another key statutory factor, (3)(e), requires the Department
to assess “whether the proposed fill or removal conforms to sound
policies of conservation and would not interfere with public health
and safety.”412 Evaluating this factor, the Department referenced
extensive impacts to tribal fishing (both commercial and
subsistence) in the immediate vicinity of the project area as well as
in the Columbia River system. These impacts included, for example,
physical interference with fishing nets, conflicts between barges and
nets, safety threats from entanglements between nets and boats, or
from capsized boats, and the impacts to fish from noise and light.413
The tribal fishing evidence might not have been the only fisheries
evidence in the record that influenced the agency in weighing this
411
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factor because the Department noted that it had received “thousands
of comments that . . . the facility may lead to adverse effects to
aquatic habitat, fishing or public health and safety.” However, this
evidence was the only fishing evidence set forth in the Department’s
discussion of this important factor. At the end of that discussion the
agency stated, “The Department finds that the proposed fill does not
conform to sound policies of conservation. For example, the
proposed fill would obstruct a small but important long-standing
fishery in the project area.”414
In the portion of the opinion actually applying the two
governing standards, the Department again emphasized tribal
fishing. It found the proposed project would not be “consistent with
the protection, conservation, and best use” of the state’s water
resources. While the Department noted that the determination was
supported by a number of considerations, it chose to elaborate on
just two: alternatives to the project, and the impact of tribal fishing
in the project area. Listing extensive submitted tribal evidence and
affidavits, the agency wrote, “the Department finds and concludes
that the evidence supporting that there is a small but important longstanding fishery at the project site is more persuasive than the
evidence submitted by the applicant regarding fishing at the project
site.”415 Similarly, the agency found that the proposed project would
not be consistent with the second governing standard, to “preserve .
. . waters for navigation, fishing and public recreation.” Its treatment
of this standard was brief, concluding (yet once again) that the
project would “unreasonably interfere with a small but important
and long-standing fishery . . . at the project site.” The Department’s
decision was upheld by the Office of Administrative Hearings in
2016.416
Beyond the importance of the Coyote Island Terminal denial
to the immediate tribal fishing interests, the administrative saga is
quite instructive on a broader level. First, it demonstrates how tribal
treaty rights may play a role in a state agency’s decision that is
structured by a statutory regime intended to benefit the general
public. In this case, there were statutory principles providing
protection of waters and fisheries, and the tribal fishing rights
successfully fit within that principled realm. It is likely that other
414
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states have similar broad statutory standards intending to protect
water and fisheries, and these too may provide a legal hook for the
assertion of unique tribal interests. Second, this case study
demonstrates the important role of tribal advocacy. The tribes had
submitted extensive evidence that formed a major basis of the
Department’s conclusions. The Columbia River tribes were greatly
assisted by CRITFC, having over 100 staff persons, including
scientists, advocates, and policy experts charged with promoting the
protection of the tribes’ treaty fisheries and fishing rights.417 And
finally, as parties in the administrative proceedings surrounding this
project, the tribes were positioned to assert staunch opposition to
fossil fuels more broadly through the media. When Umatilla tribal
leader Chuck Sams was interviewed about the Coyote Island project,
he explained (as paraphrased in the article) that the tribe “does not
approve of the Columbia River as a corridor for dangerous fossil
fuels.”418 JoDe Goudy, the Yakama tribal council chairman, said in
a statement, “Yakama Nation will not rest until the entire regional
threat posed by the coal industry to our ancestral lands and waters is
eradicated.”419 By affirmatively asserting their treaty-guaranteed
U&A fishing rights, these four Columbia River fishing tribes played
an important role not only in defeating a looming fossil fuel
transport project on the Columbia River, and in blazing a way
through a state permit system that failed to include tribal interests in
its express provisions, but also in using their legal platform to assert
a broad leadership vision for opposing fossil fuels region-wide.
b.  

Millennium Bulk Terminals Denial

Most recently, in September 2017, the State of Washington
denied a permit with prejudice for another coal export facility on the
Columbia River, citing potential harm to tribal treaty fishing rights
417
418
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as one of several grounds.420 The proposed Millennium Bulk
Terminal at Longview, Washington, was designed to transfer 44
million metric tons of coal from trains to ocean going vessels per
year, enough to increase U.S. coal exports by 40 percent.421 The
proposed export facility necessitated construction of rail beds,
loading and dock facilities, transfer stations, pads, conveyors, and
various buildings.422 The project would have impacted over thirtytwo acres of wetlands and included nearly five acres of new
overwater coverage. 423 The construction required a Section 401
Water Quality Certificate issued by the Washington Department of
Ecology, exercising its authority under the federal Clean Water
Act.424 In order to issue such a certification, the agency must
determine the project will not only comply with state water quality
standards, but also with “other appropriate requirements of state
law.”425 The agency scrutinized the Millennium Bulk Terminal
application to measure its compliance with not only water quality
standards, but also the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA).
Tribes played an active role in opposing construction of the
Millennium Bulk Terminal. The Cowlitz Tribe, whose tribal
headquarters are located in Longview and whose ancestral territory
includes much of southwest Washington, filed written comments
with the Department of Ecology and requested government-togovernment consultations with state and federal officials regarding
the proposed facility.426 Cowlitz Chairman Bill Iyall publicly stated
420
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the proposed project “represents a massive movement of fossil fuels
across the landscape through sensitive environments, impacting
animals, fish, plant life.”427 The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation, which holds U&A treaty fishing rights in and
along the Columbia, also actively opposed construction of the
facility and the associated transport of coal-by-rail along its treaty
fishing waters.428 The tribe’s Department of Natural Resources
submitted comments in the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)
process highlighting not only the potential harm to fishing at treaty
sites, but also more broadly, the harm to fish habitat, air quality, and
the climate system in general from greenhouse gas emissions as a
consequence of massive coal transported by rail as a result of the
proposed project.429
In its order denying the application, the Washington
Department of Ecology (WDOE) found the proposed project failed
to meet the water quality standards, but more importantly for this
discussion, found it conflicted with the stated purposes of the SEPA
to “avoid or mitigate adverse environmental impacts.”430 The
WDOE relied heavily on evidence developed through an
environmental impact statement (EIS) prepared jointly by Cowlitz
County and the WDOE. That EIS identified nine areas of
“unavoidable and significant adverse environmental impacts” that
would result from the project and could not be mitigated.431 The first
eight dealt with, respectively: 1) air quality; 2) vehicle
transportation; 3) noise and vibration; 4) social and community
resources (including impacts on health); 5) rail transportation; 6) rail
safety; 7) marine vessel transportation; and 8) cultural resources.
With the exception of the last, which made brief mention of
“potentially affected Native American tribes,” those areas did not
focus on uniquely tribal concerns. The final, ninth ground, however,
was devoted solely to “tribal resources” which the agency defined
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to “refer to tribal fishing, and gathering practices and treaty rights.”
The language clearly incorporates the interests of the Umatilla
Tribe, which asserted its treaty rights in its comments, and the
Cowlitz Tribe, which has no federally recognized treaty rights at this
time but nevertheless had significant interests at stake.432 WDOE
specified, “These [tribal] resources may include plants or fish used
for commercial, subsistence, and ceremonial purposes.”433
The discussion of tribal resources, while only one of many
grounds for permit denial, was ground-breaking in many important
aspects. First, the WDOE recognized not just direct impacts from
the project on tribal fishing, but also the indirect ecological impacts
to the fishery itself. Applying, but without explicitly mentioning, the
Culverts treaty right of environmental protection, the agency
examined the many potential harms to the fishery including: 1) the
risk of fish being stranded through vessel wakes; 2) the addition of
coal dust to waters and habitat areas; and 3) the potential harm to
fish behavior caused by dredging and noise and other effects.434
These impacts led the agency to conclude, “these impacts could
reduce the number of fish surviving to adulthood and . . . affect the
number of fish available for harvest by Native American Tribes.”435
Second, the agency explored not just the project area around
the proposed terminal, but the much more expansive area impacted
by rail operations associated with the proposed terminal. The
expansion of scope was key, and urged by the Umatilla Tribe,
because its treaty fishing occurs in Zone 6 upriver of Bonneville
Dam and several miles upstream from the actual proposed terminal
at the Port of Longview. Recognizing the associated train traffic was
a predictable consequence of the project, the denial order stated,
“The additional Project-related trains travelling through areas
adjacent to and within the usual and accustomed fishing areas of
Native American Tribes could restrict access to fishing areas in the
432
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Columbia River.”436 The WDOE specified, “The increase in 16
additional Millennium-related trains per day traveling through areas
adjacent to and within the fishing areas of Native American Tribes
would restrict access to 20 tribal fishing sites . . . in the Columbia
River. There are additional access sites that are not mapped that
would be impacted.”437
Third, WDOE recognized a realm of impacts that could not
be quantified with precision—factors such as fish distribution and
fish migration periods made it difficult to quantify the effect of the
project on tribal fishing—but found that these factors could not be
ignored or dismissed, citing SEPA’s language that “presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given
appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
and technical considerations.”
Fourth, the agency’s ruling did not fall back on mitigation
promises made by the railroad, but instead drew a strict line on the
role of mitigation. Acknowledging that conceivable mitigation steps
(such as minimizing noise and conducting fish monitoring prior to
dredging) could be required of Millennium to reduce impacts to
fisheries and tribal fishing interests, the agency held, “[t]hese
mitigation steps are inadequate because although noise impacts from
construction would be reduced, they would not be eliminated, and
fish behavior could be altered and affect the number of fish available
for harvest by Native American Tribes.”438 Through its discussion
of “mitigation” measures, the agency set a low threshold of harm
that would trigger permit denial, arguably paralleling the de minimis
federal standard established in caselaw dealing with impacts to
treaty rights.439
Finally, the agency precisely tied the impact on tribal
resources to its governing statutory authority of SEPA, as it must
under established Washington law if it relies on SEPA to deny a
permit. 440 The impact of SEPA can be substantive, supporting a
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permit denial even if all other statutory and permit requirements are
met,441 but courts demand precision in citing the agency SEPA
policy that is the basis of any denial. WDOE concluded, as a factual
matter, that “Millennium at full operations would result in
unavoidable significant adverse impacts to tribal resources” and
stated that such impacts to tribal resources are “inconsistent with the
following Ecology SEPA policies:”
1) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee
of the environment for succeeding generations;
2) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage;
3) [E]nsure that presently unquantified environmental
amenities and values will be given appropriate
consideration in decision making. . . .
On appeal, the State Pollution Hearings Board upheld the
decision in a lengthy opinion. Notably, the Board underscored the
WDOE’s authority to deny a permit on substantive SEPA grounds,
relying on established Washington law making clear that “‘[a]ny
governmental action may be conditioned or denied’ based on the
adverse environmental impacts disclosed in an EIS.” The board
added, “Using SEPA substantive authority, a decision maker may
deny a permit even if it meets all of the requirements for approval
under permit criteria.”442 This substantive effect of SEPA
effectively means that, as long as impacts to tribal resources are
substantiated, the decision-making agency has a realm of authority
under state law within which to deny permits in furtherance of treaty
obligations, even if all other statutory permit requirements are met.
Oregon lacks such a state environmental policy act, but as the
Coyote Island case showed, the state has other potential statutory
protections that can import treaty rights protection into the legal
regime.
The company seeking to develop Millennium Bulk appealed
the State’s denial of a Section 401 Certificate to the Superior Court
of Cowlitz County,443 so the future of this landmark decision
remains unsettled. However, the case as it stands now holds
441
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tremendous importance as a guiding light for tribes seeking to assert
their treaty rights (and non-treaty fishing rights) to halt fossil fuel
transport. Like the Coyote Island case, the Millennium Bulk
Terminals case represents a state agency premising its denial
substantially, although not exclusively, on tribal fishing interests.
These case studies both show the potential for Pacific Northwest
state agencies to factor tribal treaty rights into state decisions
regarding fossil fuel infrastructure, and legally tie the tribal interests
into broader state law standards focused on promoting general
public concerns. The fusion of state environmental standards with
treaty rights obligations (the supreme law of the land) holds
significant potential in fortifying a legal blockade against fossil fuel
transport through the Pacific Northwest.
3.  

Local: Applying the “Supreme Law of the Land”
at Ground Level

Local governments also provide a jurisdictional context for
tribes to assert treaty rights to block fossil fuel infrastructure
projects. Notably, local governments may have considerable interest
in stopping oil “bomb trains,” coal trains, and pipelines that threaten
the health and safety of citizens and harm ecosystems. Counties and
cities can choose to pass ordinances prohibiting fossil fuel
infrastructure from entering their jurisdictions.444 The potential issue
with such ordinances is preemption, just as it is with tribal
ordinances that seek to prevent fossil fuel transport on-reservation.
However, recent case law suggests that local governments may in
some circumstances secure local permit denials against preemption
claims if they deny local fossil fuel infrastructure permits on the sole
ground of carrying out their sovereign duty to uphold federal treaty
promises to tribes.445 The case below involving Wasco County’s
denial of a railroad expansion permit represents one such instance
and provides a fascinating glimpse into this legal possibility. While
this case arose out of a unique legal context explained below—one
444

Spokane, Washington and Portland, Oregon are two cities that have passed
such ordinances. The issue of whether local ordinances will withstand
preemption without any role of treaty rights is a timely and complex issue, but
beyond the scope of this Article. This article limits the focus to a case study
involving one town that denied a permit based exclusively on treaty rights
considerations.
445
This article odes not explore other arguments that may be successful in
defeating preemption.

340

that should invoke caution against simplistic overgeneralization of
its applicability to other contexts—nevertheless, the legal possibility
raised by this case invites tribes and local decision makers to become
allies in a joint effort to combat fossil fuel proposals that threaten
their mutual interests.
a.  

Wasco County Halts Oil-by-Rail Expansion

The leading case of a local government invoking and
upholding treaty rights in the face of fossil fuels has played out in
Wasco County, Oregon, along the banks of the Columbia River
where three different interests converge. Four tribes retain U&A
treaty fishing rights within this section of the Columbia River: the
Nez Perce Tribe, the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama
Indian Nation, the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, and the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.446 The
same area features spectacular scenery and is a designated national
scenic area protected under the National Scenic Area Act.447 And,
the corridor also serves as a primary transportation route for trains
carrying highly volatile Bakken oil as well as coal from the interior
United States to western ports such as Portland, Oregon and
Longview, Washington. Wasco County found itself at the
intersection of those interests when Union Pacific Railroad applied
to the County in January 2015 for a permit to construct and expand
a section of rail track along the Columbia River near the city of
Mosier in the designated National Scenic Area. The county permit
requirement derived from, and was developed pursuant to, the
federal legislation creating the scenic area (the National Scenic Area
Act, described more fully below). The track expansion would have
allowed Union Pacific to increase transport of trains carrying crude
oil through the Columbia River Gorge.448
On June 3, 2016, as the permit application was pending
before the County, a Union Pacific train hauling ninety-six tank cars
carrying Bakken oil from North Dakota derailed near the very
project site that was subject to the permit application.449 Several cars
446
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exploded, sending black plumes of smoke high into the air. The
nearby town of Mosier was evacuated, as well as a school and homes
in close proximity to the flaming railcars, and Interstate 84 was shut
down to traffic. A total of 42,000 gallons of oil spilled, leaving about
18,000 gallons of oil in the soil near the Columbia River, and an oil
sheen appeared on the Columbia River the day following the
accident; subsequently 10,000 gallons of oil were recovered from
the city’s sewer plant.450 Multiple agencies responded to the fire, and
with the threat of the blaze triggering a uncontrollable wildfire in the
dry Gorge during a hot summer, Governor Kate Brown invoked the
Conflagration Act to augment fire-fighting resources needed to
contain the blaze. While there were no fatalities from the train wreck
and resulting explosion, Executive Director Paul Lumley of the
Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission told the press, “We’ve
got to do something to stop this. This was too close of a call.”451
Despite the remarkable backdrop set by the calamity at the
site just three months earlier, the Wasco County Planning
Commission approved Union Pacific’s application for track
expansion with conditions on September 29, 2016.452 The Yakama
Nation as well as Union Pacific and a coalition of non-governmental
organizations filed three separate appeals of the decision to the
Wasco County Board of Commissioners. That board reversed the
Planning Commission’s decision on November 14, 2016 on the
basis that the project would impair the fishing rights of the four
tribes with treaty rights in the National Scenic Area.453 Pursuant to
the process set forth in the National Scenic Area Act described
below, Union Pacific appealed the decision the Columbia River
Gorge Commission (CRGC), a regional agency established by the
450
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Act.454 Shortly after filing that administrative appeal, and while it
was pending, Union Pacific filed a separate complaint in the federal
district court of Oregon against Wasco County commissioners as
well as members of the CRGC seeking a declaratory order to end
the ongoing administrative process, arguing that federal law
pertaining to railroad transportation preempts the permitting process
established under the National Scenic Area Act.455 On March 8,
2017, the court dismissed the case on a procedural ground described
in Section 4 below (an appeal of that decision is pending in the Ninth
Circuit). On September 8, 2017, the CRGC issued a lengthy and
thorough opinion upholding the decision of the Wasco Board of
Commissioners to deny the permit on the basis of tribal treaty rights
impairment. The discussion below examines in detail the CRGC
decision, focusing on its conclusions regarding the Board’s
authority to deny a permit based on tribal treaty rights, and,
relatedly, its discussion of a threshold preemption issue. Section 4
then discusses the federal district court’s dismissal of the railroad’s
challenge to the administrative process, highlighting the intertwined
procedural principles of tribal sovereign immunity and
indispensable parties that prompted the dismissal.
b.  

The County’s Permit Requirement and the Board’s Denial

While it likely comes as a surprise to many that a local
county board of commissioners in Oregon would deny a land use
permit solely on the basis of treaty rights, the result is quite
explainable by reference to the federal statutory context authorizing
the land use decision. Wasco County’s permit requirement derives
from both the National Scenic Area Act that established the
300,000-acre federally protected area spanning both the States of
Washington and Oregon in the Columbia River Gorge, and the
associated Columbia River Gorge Compact that was executed
between the two states and received consent of Congress. Pursuant
to the compact, the CRGC was created as a regional agency to write
(in concert with the U.S. Forest Service) a management plan for the
National Scenic Area. The Act mandated that all land use within the
scenic area was to be consistent with the standards set forth in the
454
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Act.456 The federal legislation relied on local counties to carry out
the federal protections through their local land use mechanisms.
Under this federal scheme, the six counties within the National
Scenic Area were required to adopt land use ordinances to carry out
the purposes of the act. Such ordinances were subject to review by
the CRGC for consistency with the management plan it formulated
for the Gorge.457 The permit sought by the Union Pacific was
required by Wasco County’s National Scenic Area Land Use and
Development Ordinance (referred to as NSALUDO), which is the
County’s land use regulation implementing the National Scenic
Area Act. 458
Wasco County’s NSALUDO, as an instrumentality of the
federal law from which it derives, both reflects and incorporates the
National Scenic Area Act’s emphasis on protection of Indian treaty
rights in the Gorge. Express statutory language in that Act specifies
that nothing the in the Act shall “affect or modify any treaty or other
rights of any Indian Tribe.”459 This provision manifests in the
Management Plan devised by the CRGC: that plan expressly
prohibits uses that would affect or modify a treaty right.460 The Plan
defines “effect on treaty rights” (in pertinent part) as “to bring about
a change in . . . or to have a consequence to Indian treaty or treaty
related rights in the Treaties of 1855 with the Nez Perce, Umatilla,
Warm Springs and Yakima tribes. . . . “461 Wasco County’s
NSALUDO (the land use provision implementing the Act) brings
the federal prohibition to the local level by expressly stating: “The
County shall decide whether the proposed uses would affect or
modify any treaty or other rights of any Indian tribe. . . . Uses that
would affect or modify such rights shall be prohibited.”462
Three of the four tribes with treaty rights in the Columbia
456
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Gorge—the Yakama Nation, Umatilla Tribe, and Warm Springs
Tribe—all provided evidence to the Wasco County Board of
Commissioners describing how the Union Pacific proposal would
violate their treaty rights.463 Based on this evidence, the Board
denied the permit in November 2016, finding an impermissible
impairment of treaty-reserved rights, and denied the permit
application, carrying out the mandate (of the local ordinance
implementing the federal law) that “uses that would affect or modify
such rights shall be prohibited.”464 Applying the County Ordinance,
the Wasco County Board of Commissioners “conclude[ed] that the
project would impair treaty-reserved fishing rights of the four
Columbia River Treaty Tribes.”465
c.  

The CRGC’s Review

Pursuant to the process established by the National Scenic
Area Act, Union Pacific brought an appeal of the Wasco County
Board of Commissioner’s decision before the CRGC. The CRGC is
charged with supervising the development and enforcement of
county land use ordinances within the National Scenic Area,
including resolving appeals from county permitting decisions.466
During the course of the permit appeal before the CRGC, tribes
participated in various ways. The Yakama Nation, as a party to the
appeal, provided extensive evidence and briefing regarding how the
Union Pacific proposal would affect its treaty reserved fishing
rights.467 The Warm Springs and Umatilla Tribes and Columbia
River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission submitted separate amicus
curiae briefs setting forth evidence of treaty interference caused by
the proposal.468 Importantly, the arguments propounded by the tribes
focused not only on acute, immediate threats posed by increased
train traffic and infrastructure development, but also the risk of
463
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derailment and spill, and more broadly, the aggravation of climate
change caused by emissions from the transported oil.469 The
CRGC’s 52-page opinion handed down on September 8, 2017
upheld the permit denial and provides deep contextual grounding for
the remarkable outcome of Wasco County’s process, a local land
use permit denial based exclusively on grounds of interference with
treaty rights.
i.  

The CRGC’s Preemption Analysis

The CRGC opinion confronted the preemption argument at
the outset. Union Pacific argued that Wasco County’s permit
requirement was local in nature and preempted by the federal
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA),
which regulates rail transportation.470 As observed throughout this
article, the preemption issue is pivotal to the ability of local
governments to stop dangerous fossil fuel transportation through
their jurisdictions, such as the “bomb trains” carrying Bakken oil
like the one that derailed and exploded in Mosier, Oregon in June
2016.
The CRGC soundly rejected the preemption argument on
seemingly two separate bases. First, the CRGC reviewed substantial
precedent and concluded the local ordinance warrants treatment as
federal law because it is both required by federal law and
implements federal law (the National Scenic Area Act). As the
CRGC concluded: “These National Scenic Area authorities and
other case law involving other cooperative federalism laws also
suggest that Wasco County’s NSALUDO is itself federal law, again,
not local or state law.”471 As a federal law, it resists preemption as
long as the law from which it derives (the National Scenic Area Act)
may be harmonized with the ICCTA. Applying relevant factors from
case law, the CRGC found the two laws could coexist harmoniously,
and that Wasco County’s regulation (and implementing decision)
469
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was not preempted.472
The importance of this analysis directly extends beyond
Wasco County to the other five counties that implement the National
Scenic Area Act. Under this analysis, any of those counties could
similarly defeat preemption challenges to their local ordinances
carrying out the Act. This is significant for the future of fossil fuel
transport proposals, because the Columbia River rail corridor,
situated as it is between the U.S. interior’s coal and oil reserves and
the coastal ports of Oregon and Washington, presumably remains a
key link in the global export designs of the fossil fuel industry.
Beyond the practical significance of the stunning leverage held by
those six counties under the National Scenic Area Act, the Wasco
County case opens a field of questions as to whether any other
statutory areas of localized federalism operate in a manner sufficient
to defeat preemption (a matter beyond the scope of this Article but
worth noting).
The second basis asserted by the CRGC for finding no
preemption bar seemingly rested entirely on treaty rights grounds.473
The CRGC concluded: “The ICCTA does not preempt Wasco
County’s NSALUDO because Wasco County is complying with the
Columbia River Treaties.”474 It reasoned that, since the ICCTA does
not evince clear congressional intent to abrogate tribal treaty rights,
“the treaties remain the supreme law of the land.”475 While the
CRGC’s discussion is brief, its conclusion is weighty: Wasco
County’s Ordinance, by carrying out the supreme law of the land,
survives a preemption challenge.476
Stepping back to the preemption analysis in its entirety
472

See CRGC Order, supra note 444, at 18-23.
There is a bit of ambiguity, however, in the CRGC’s passing statement that
treaty rights creates and “additional layer of preemption analysis on top of
factors expressed by the STB and Ninth Circuit.” The statement could be
interpreted as providing a treaty-rights backdrop to what is essentially a driving
statutory analysis. However, the segregation of the analysis in a different section
of the opinion, set apart and following the statutory analysis section, indicates
that indeed the CRGC regarded the treaty rights basis as a separate basis for
finding no preemptive effect of federal transportation law.
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Id. at 24.
476
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(encompassing both grounds), the significance of the CRGC’s
holding is great. The county’s denial of a fossil fuel infrastructure
permit amounts to assertion of local control in a legal context
heavily dominated by federal law.477 Here, the local entity
succeeded in shielding its action from the inevitable preemption
challenge both by 1) linking it to the federal legal structure of the
National Scenic Area Act (from which the permit requirement
derived); and by 2) premising the denial exclusively on treaty rights,
which remain the supreme law of the land unabrogated by any
federal rail transportation laws. The duality of that defense begs the
question of whether a local ordinance protecting treaty rights can
alone, without the backing of a federal statutory structure such as
the Scenic Area Act, can survive a preemption challenge.478 In light
of the counties’ derivative responsibility (as sub-sovereigns of the
state) to uphold treaty promises securing fishing rights—promises
that recently received a strong judicial pronouncement of
environmental protection in the Culverts case described in section—
a strong argument exists that local entities in the Pacific Northwest
may legally shield some decisions from preemption even outside a
federal scheme such as the Scenic Area Act if they carefully tailor
their regulatory decision to the binding federal purpose of protecting
the use and enjoyment of treaty secured tribal fishing rights. In short,
applying the “supreme law of the land” at the local level brings an
entirely new frame to traditional preemption challenges. In this
manner, while the National Scenic Area Act provides the genesis of
477

Moreover, the project had already obtained another necessary permit from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. See
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Wasco County’s unique regulation, the circumstances of this case
suggest a window of possibility much broader than the Wasco
County permit saga itself. The possibility of treaty rights protection
through localized regulation will undoubtedly be explored as local
entities and tribes develop stronger partnerships to resist dangerous
fossil fuel transportation through their shared geographies.
ii.  

The CRGC’s Treaty Rights Analysis

Moving to the substantive heart of the matter, the CRGC
upheld Wasco County’s decision to deny the rail expansion permit,
finding that it was supported by substantial evidence of impacts on
tribal treaty fishing rights.479 The CRGC’s opinion set forth several
important analytical steps worthy of note and provides valuable
guidance on some of the more nuanced issues raised in the
enforcement of treaty promises.
Geographical Scope of the U&A Right
One central issue concerned the geographic scope of the
treaty right—a matter approached quite differently by the tribes and
Union Pacific. The railroad argued the right attached only to specific
U&A locations that were historically identified, as well as “in-lieu”
sites (provided as replacements for sites inundated by dams). The
treaty tribes defined the treaty reserved rights as applying to the
entire Columbia River in Zone 6, the river area managed under
treaty cases as the exclusive Indian commercial fishing area.480
Obviously, beyond the immediate impacts to tribal fishing in the
project area, the effects of increased rail traffic could affect fishing
throughout Zone 6 because the rail line follows the river. The CRGC
summoned extensive and longstanding case law dealing with
Columbia River tribal treaty rights to adopt the tribes’ geographical
interpretation of the treaty zone of interest, concluding:
We agree with the tribes and Columbia River Inter-Tribal
Fish Commission that treaty fishing rights are not
479
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geographically limited to specifically identifiable
historically used stations, but that the term ‘usual and
accustomed’ encompasses all of Zone 6 without need to
establish specific historical access points to Zone 6. The
right also includes the right of crossing land to access the
Columbia River from the Winans case noted above.481
The CRGC also underscored the role of the tribes in the
Gorge protection framework established under the Management
Plan and highlighted a presumption that worked in their favor. The
plan incorporates a process that both secures tribal governments a
role in decision-making and provides space for the “Indian worldview,” which the Plan drafters recognized as being different from
the non-Indian approach.482 To that end, as noted by the CRGC in
its Order, “the treaty rights protection process in the Management
Plan creates [a] rebuttable presumption in favor of tribal
governments when they identify and describe an effect on treaty
rights in the National Scenic Area.” At various points in the opinion,
the CRGC applauded and affirmed Wasco County’s approach,
which “consider[ed] the Indian world view and adopted the tribes’
perspective of effect of treaty rights.”483
The Treaty Right of Environmental Protection and the Role of Risk
Having defined the geographic scope of the treaty right, the
CRGC next addressed the substantive rights secured by the treaty.
The tribes presented evidence of interference with their fishing site
access as a result of increased train traffic and mounting safety
concerns relating to tribal fishers who regularly cross train tracks.
Such interference directly impinges on the access that is part of the
treaty secured fishing right and would seemingly be an ample
ground to deny the permit. The CRGC noted that it did not need a
481
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second reason to uphold the permit denial.484 But the tribes also
presented environmental threats posed by increased train traffic,
leading the CRGC to squarely address the right of habitat protection.
It began with the correct premise that the treaty fishing right includes
a right to fish habitat as a result of the recent Culverts decision
(described in Section IV.B, supra), stating, “Courts have now settled
that the Columbia River Treaty Tribes’ treaty fishing right includes
the right to fish habitat free from human acts of despoliation.”485 It
then substantially advanced the analysis of the environmental
protection right by observing,
This matter presents a slight twist on the culverts case that
Judge Martinez [of the Western District of Washington]
decided. In the culverts case, the tribes presented specific
information about current habitat damage relating to fishblocking culverts. Here the tribes describe a high risk of
future environmental degradation rather than current
degradation. . . . Nothing in [the Culverts decision and Ninth
Circuit decision affirming it] requires the tribes take a wait
and see approach to protecting their treaty-reserved places
from environmental degradation where [the] administrative
record contains substantial evidence that a derailment and
spill into or adjacent to the Columbia River would damage
or destroy habitat in Zone 6, which the federal government,
the tribes, and others have spent decades restoring.486
This interpretation of the habitat protection right is pathbreaking in the sense that it applies the right prospectively against
significant risk. Turning to the evidence developed by Wasco
County in its record, CRGC noted that the railroad project would
allow for five to seven more trains to pass through Zone 6, “and
those trains [would be] longer and travel faster.”487 Citing a report
stating that there were more than 2,500 derailments between 2008
and 2015, that “greater tank car damage can be expected at higher
speeds,” and referencing the derailment and explosion in Mosier in
2016 at the proposed project site, the CRGC concluded,
484
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While no party can say for sure whether or when a train will
derail and affect treaty-protected habitat, the record . . .
supports Wasco County’s conclusion that this project
significantly increases the likelihood that it will happen.”488
We believe that Wasco County honored Governor Stevens’s
promise of salmon forever when it concluded that it could
not approve Union Pacific’s application where there was
concrete and substantial evidence . . . in the whole record of
a significantly increased risk of treaty fishing habitat
degradation.489
In its totality, the CRGC’s decision relied upon substantial
precedent to forge analysis of treaty rights in the modern era where
the major threats to Indian treaty rights arise not from state game
wardens arresting tribal fishers, but from the risk of catastrophic
spills into the river, and more existentially, a heated planet that
would send the salmon into collapse.490 While the statutory context
giving rise to the Wasco County denial is unique, the case sends a
clear indication that tribes are playing a historic role through
science, advocacy, and assertion of their treaty rights in protecting
their traditional territories and time-honored cultural practices
against the next wave of industrial onslaught coming down the
tracks.
4.  

Procedural Power: Tribal Sovereigns as Necessary and
Indispensable Parties

Another chapter of the Wasco County case unfolded in the
federal district court of Oregon, resulting in a 2017 decision that
turned on an aspect of tribal sovereignty. As noted earlier, while the
Columbia River Gorge Commission’s administrative process
described above was underway, Union Pacific brought a complaint
in federal court seeking to stop the process. In the case called Union
488
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Pacific Railroad v. Runyon.491 Union Pacific argued (as it did before
the CRGC) that the ICCTA preempted Wasco County’s ordinance.
The federal district court dismissed the complaint based on
procedural grounds that may have potential application in other
instances of state or local permit denials of fossil fuel projects.
The ruling navigated a complicated realm at the intersection
of federal Indian law and the rules of civil procedure. In a nutshell,
the court dismissed the case because it found the tribes to be
“necessary and indispensable parties” (as described under Rule 19
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)), without which the
case could not proceed, yet the tribes could not be joined by the
defendant railroad because of their inherent sovereign immunity.
This interaction of tribal sovereign immunity and Rule 19 is familiar
in the context of federal Indian law, but threads a narrow
jurisdictional needle nonetheless. The ramifications may be pivotal
when applied to Pacific Northwest treaty tribes that are fighting
fossil fuel proposals, because the major potential impediment to
local and state regulation is the preemption bar raised by federal
transportation laws. Fossil fuel interests have long enjoyed
dominance within the scheme of federal preemption,492 yet
preemption is only relevant if enforced in court. The Runyan ruling
suggests that, under Rule 19 of the FRCP,493 sovereign tribal nations
possess a unique procedural power to prevent companies involved
in transporting fossil fuels from invalidating permit denials by local
and state authorities.
Tribes Prevailing on Rule 19 in the District of Oregon
Three tribes with treaty-reserved fishing rights in the
Columbia River successfully leveraged their tribal sovereign
immunity to win dismissal of Union Pacific’s federal preemption
suit on procedural grounds.494 Though they were not parties in the
suit,495 The Yakama, Umatilla, and Warm Springs Tribes filed a
motion with the court to dismiss the case for failure to join them as
necessary and indispensable parties under Rule 19, “while expressly
491
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reserving their sovereign immunity.”496
As the Runyon court summarized, Rule 19 creates a threestep inquiry for determining whether a case must be dismissed for
failure to join a party:
1)   Is the absent party necessary to the case?
2)   If so, is it feasible to order that the absent party be joined?
3)   If joinder is not feasible, can the case proceed absent the
party, or is that party so indispensable that the action
must be dismissed in that party’s absence?497
The Runyon court applied three factors to the tribes,
emphasizing along the way the Ninth Circuit’s “broad, practical, and
fact-specific approach” to Rule 19(a)(1)’s “Required Party”
requirements. First, the Court determined that the treaty tribes were
“necessary parties,” based on their vital treaty interests at stake in
the case. The tribes demonstrated their treaty fishing rights were
cognizable interests498 sufficiently related to the subject of the action
(challenge to the permit denial) so that proceeding without the tribes
would impair the court’s abilities to protect the tribes’ interests in
treaty fishing, and further, that the present parties were not capable
of adequately representing the tribes’ interests.499 A significant part
of the Court’s reasoning was that “[t]he sole basis for [the county’s
permit] denial was interference with the Treaty Tribes’ treatyreserved fishing rights.” As the court elaborated, “Had the Wasco
Board made a different finding about treaty rights, it would have
granted the permit and this lawsuit never would have been filed. . .
. Similarly, if plaintiff’s argument regarding preemption were to
succeed, it would affect the Treaty Tribes’ treaty-reserved fishing
rights because it would enable plaintiff to proceed with its railway
expansion project through land that is subject to those rights.”500
496
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Applying the second factor, the Court held that due to their
tribal sovereign immunity, the tribes could not be compelled to join
the action, and therefore, their joinder was not feasible.501 The
doctrine of sovereign immunity is an ancient common law doctrine
shielding sovereign governments from suit unless the sovereign
consents to an action. The principle was imported into American
jurisprudence early in this country’s history502 and has been applied
to federal, state, and tribal governments.503 In Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, the U.S. Supreme Court announced, “Indian tribes have
long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from
suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”504 Courts have
recognized tribal sovereign immunity as one of the “important rights
and protections” of tribes’ sovereign status.505
The third and final phase of the court’s Rule 19 analysis
established that Tribes were “indispensable” parties.506 The court

denial [by the Wasco County Commission] that rested solely on the finding that
the Project would harm Treaty Tribes’ rights. The relationship between this
lawsuit and the Treaty Tribe’s rights is direct, not incidental.”).
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emphasized the unique factual circumstances before it, and the risk
to the tribes’ interests should the case go forward.507 Moreover, it
found that the plaintiff retained an adequate remedy after dismissal,
because the Columbia River Gorge Commission provided an
adequate alternative forum for Union Pacific to air its grievances.508
Accordingly, the Runyon Court dismissed Union Pacific’s
preemption suit for failure to join the Umatilla, Warm Springs, and
Yakama Tribes as necessary and indispensable parties to the
action.509 Though the case is now on appeal before the Ninth Circuit,
it provides a valuable template for how tribes may assert tribal
sovereign immunity as a procedural shield against preemption
claims that that undermine local protection of treaty resources.
While preemption certainly has a legitimate and complicated place
in the federal-state allocation of power, its singular use by fossil fuel
corporations to thwart local protection of vital resources
perpetuates, in essence, an industrial hegemony over natural wealth
and local landscapes—and may prove disastrous to tribes and local
communities alike. As established in the Runyon case, Rule 19
provides one important legal avenue for tribes to push back, exerting
their role as necessary, indispensable, and inherent sovereigns of the
Pacific Northwest.
V.   CONCLUSION
In the face of record-breaking temperatures and rising sea
levels, tribes of the Pacific Northwest are emerging as leaders in this
planetary crisis. While federal officials in power continue to speed
full-throttle toward climate chaos, the region’s original sovereigns
are taking legal action to curb dangerous fossil fuel transport and
export. For example, the Lummi Nation prevented the release of
ninety-six million metric tons of carbon dioxide annually when the
tribe halted the construction of Gateway Pacific Terminal at Cherry
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Point, or Xwe’chi’eXen, in northwest Washington State.510 The
Umatilla, Warm Springs, Yakama, and Nez Perce Tribes prevented
an additional 16 million metric tons of carbon dioxide from being
released into the atmosphere each year when together they stopped
Coyote Island Terminal on the Columbia River.511 Tribes are
deploying sophisticated legal strategies to halt the transport and
export of fossil fuels through the Pacific Northwest, perhaps
transforming what industry once deemed a regional gateway for
fossil fuel transportation into a chokehold instead.
Every ruling in favor of tribal communities against pipelines,
coal cars, and “bomb trains” is also a victory for the planet and
future generations of all people. The climate crisis dwarfs virtually
all other crises Humanity faces. There is frighteningly scant time to
change course, as the Chief of the United Nations emphasized in
September 2018, when he issued a warning that the world must take
action by 2020 to avert runaway climate change.512 As underscored
by Pacific Northwest tribes in their multiple resolutions, an urgent
climate response demands rejecting fossil fuel infrastructure
proposals.
Absorbing the gravity of this moment, tribes are reasserting
leadership as the necessary and indispensable original sovereigns of
planet Earth. From the banks of the Columbia River to the shores of
the Salish Sea, Northwest native nations are showing that an
effective, resilient, and inspiring environmental movement must be
rooted in a worldview that brings human activities back into balance
with Nature’s supreme laws. As our colleague, historian and former
Dean Rennard Strickland, wrote, “If there is to be a post-Columbian
future—a future for any of us—it will be an Indian future . . . a world
in which this time, . . . the superior world view . . . might even hope
to compete with, if not triumph over, technology.”513 Opposing
fossil fuel transport and export proposals, —and winning key
regulatory battles —tribes of the Pacific Northwest are creating that
Indian future today.

510

See supra Section IV.
Id.
512
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
513
Rennard Strickland, Tonto’s Revenge: Reflections on American Indian
Culture and Policy, 130 (1997).
511

357

